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THEFT FROM ARMS DEPOT TIED TO DRUG MILIEU, POLISARIO

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Sep 83 p 4

[Article by Inge D. Hanssen: "Theft of Weapons Linked to the Drug Milieu"]

[Text] Kristiansand, 15 Sep 83--AFTENPOSTEN has reason to believe that the police have found fingerprints in the arms depot in Sveindal in Vest-Agder and in the army's central storehouse on Hannas at Evje. The police have confirmed the fact that the information that the theft was carried out on behalf of Polisario, the North African liberation movement, comes from the drug milieu on Sorland.

The police in Mandal arrested a 23-year-old man from Mandal on Wednesday. He presumably will be indicted and it will be requested that he be put in custody, and he will be indicted for the theft of a rifle from a one-family house earlier in the summer. It is unlikely that he is connected with the two cases of the theft of weapons being investigated by the police in Mandal and Kristiansand, respectively.

The police naturally do not want to go into detail in regard to the clues they possess, but AFTENPOSTEN has learned that they found many fingerprints in both arms depots. Some of the fingerprints are of rather poor quality, but very good fingerprints allegedly were also found. They have been sent to the central offices of the Criminal Police in Oslo for more thorough study.

It was Wednesday afternoon when the police in Mandal arrested a 23-year-old man of that town. Under interrogation, he admitted having stolen a rifle with a telescopic sight from a house he had broken into in that town. AFTENPOSTEN has learned that the 23-year-old is known in the drug milieu. The man will presumably be brought before the magistrate's court on Friday and will be kept in custody. On Wednesday evening, the police searched a house in Iveland in Aust-Agder where the 23-year-old stayed for a while. The search did not turn up any weapons or other clues.

The 23-year-old will be interrogated exhaustively regarding two thefts to determine whether he is connected with them in any way or had knowledge of those thefts which the police can make use of in the investigation. He himself denies any connection with the thefts of weapons in Sveindal and at Evje.

A comrade of that man, also 23 years of age, was also in for interrogation by the police in Mandal on Thursday. He was still undergoing interrogation on Thursday evening, but he also denies having had anything to do with the thefts of weapons. There is reason to believe that the police want to talk with a number of people in the 23-year-old's circle of acquaintances.

The information that Polisario, the North African liberation movement, may be the employer of the thieves comes from the drug milieu on Sorland. Although this may perhaps not be the most realistic of the many tips the police have received during the investigation of the case, this information will also be investigated thoroughly. The investigation that is being carried out may indicate that the thieves' purpose was to get into contact with the liberation movement after the weapons had been stolen are extraordinarily suitable for a guerrilla organization like Polisario, and it is known from previous cases that such organizations often buy weapons and pay for them with narcotics.

The police investigation is being moved ahead vigorously, and all the personnel available to the police stations in Mandal and Kristiansand are participating in it. One of the many extensive tasks the police must carry out is that of trying to find out what people had and still have access to the two arms depots. Everything indicates that, in any case, people known locally were involved in the last theft--the one at Hannas at Evje. Furthermore, the police are carrying out certain investigations in the drug milieu on Sorland to find out whether the theory regarding Polisario may be correct.

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CSO: 3639/177

INTERNATIONAL CENTERS OF ARMENIAN TERRORISM SURVEYED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 24-28 May 83 pp 1, 14

[Text] We have obtained documents that will fully reveal the inside story of Armenian terrorist organizations which in 10 years have massacred 36 of our people from Paris to Beirut, Sydney to the Vatican and Los Angeles. We have uncovered the real aims of the more than 12 terrorist organizations that operate in conjunction with legal Armenian parties, of the seminaries that train operatives under the name of religious education, and of the youth organizations.

We have ascertained the ties of international terrorism bound up in a quadrangle of legal Armenian parties, terrorist organizations, religious centers and youth organizations. And we have brought to light the true face of ostensibly friendly countries that are attacking the Republic of Turkey by backing Armenian terrorism.

We have gone to numerous places, persons and institutions to ascertain the true face of Armenian terrorist organizations and the governments, institutions and persons working behind the scenes.

In all our requests for information starting at home, we had the doors of governments, institutions and persons who support Armenian terrorism shut in our faces. Persons and institutions opposed to Armenian terror and aware of the true face of this terror helped us as much as they could.

Although the roots of a revived Armenian terrorism date to 1973, this date should be put back to the period of Abdulhamid II.

The Armenians, who raided the Ottoman Bank and attempted to assassinate the sultan during that period, put out contracts on Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) members after World War I. They determined where these individuals were after they fled the country and began orchestrating their murders. Following are our statesmen martyred as a result of these treacherous attacks:

Former Grand Vizier and CUP member Talat Pasa, who was living in Berlin, was killed by Armenian comitadji Taylirian on 15 March 1921.

16 June 1921: Dr Bahaeddin Shakir, a member of the CUP General Headquarters, and Cemal Izmi, a member of the same body and former governor of Bursa and Konya, were shot in Berlin by Armenian comitadjis.

The former Grand Vizier Sait Halim Pasa, who was living in Rome, was murdered by Armenians on 6 December 1921.

Three key figures of the CUP, Minister of the Navy Cemal Pasa, his aide-de-camp Sureyya Bey and Nusret Bey were murdered by Armenians in the Soviet town of Tiflis on 22 July 1922.

The Armenians, who, following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, continued their activities against Turkey through organizations like Hinchak, Hamaynovar, Dashnak and Ramgavar, kept silent for a while after the killing of the CUP members. In 1946, however, an organization operating under the name the Committee for the Defense of the Armenian Cause again put the comitadjis and terrorists on the stage.

The Armenians, who held rallies against Turkey at Beirut's Camille Chamoun Stadium on 24 April 1965, also held demonstrations in Paris and London. These demonstrations continued until 1973 in Europe, the United States and Australia as well as everywhere else in the world. And the demonstrations subsequently turned into treacherous murders and bomb attacks. This time, along with four Armenian parties, several terrorist organizations emerged: ASALA, ALA, JCAG, NARO, AYAO and the Armenian Brothers Party, the All-Armenian Philanthropic Society, the Armenian Armed Struggle Organization, Group 21, Armenian Group 28, the Yanikian Commandos and the 3 October Organization.


Armenian churches and seminaries joined these organizations. Training camps were organized by various terrorist groups and certain governments ostensibly friendly to Turkey.

And the gun that fired in Los Angeles on 27 January 1973 martyred Turkish Consul-General Mehmet Bahdar and Vice Consul-General Bahadir Demir.

Others followed this treacherous murder. As the result of attacks on our foreign representatives, ambassadors, consuls, attaches, their families and embassy personnel, 36 of our "souls" have been martyred. In 11 of the countries in which acts of Armenian terror have been committed, the files on the killers have been closed. Even though the killers of five of our martyrs are known by name, the governments involved have not arrested them. This, then, is the bitter and ominous tally sheet for 10 years of Armenian terrorism.

The JCAG is the major Armenian terrorist organization from a numeric and operational standpoint.

This organization, which to date has been involved in numerous incidents, was, like ASALA, founded in 1975. And for a year carried out various actions in conjunction with that murder network. However, the murder of two ASALA operatives in 1976 put an end to their cooperation. ASALA charged that JCAG was responsible and the link between the two killer organizations became a hatred after that time. JCAG completely subordinated itself to Dashnak after 1977.



ASALA: This terrorist organization, which receives direct support from and is under the protection of the Soviet Union, regards the Armenian cause as a part of the international revolutionary movement. Its aspiration is a large Armenian state affiliated with the USSR.

Key:


- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. ASALA; headquarters: Beirut | 10. France (Marseilles) |
| 2. Press organ (The Call) | 11. U.S. (Los Angeles)/
(San Francisco)....
Codename: Mardo) |
| 3. Executive Committee | 12. Italy (Milan) |
| 4. Training camp: at Ancar village
on the Beirut-Damascus highway | 13. Australia (Sydney) |
| 5. Denmark (Copenhagen) | 14. Greece (Salonica) |
| 6. Switzerland (Geneva) | 15. Venezuela |
| 7. Egypt (Port Said) | 16. Lyon |
| 8. Syria (Damascus) | 17. Organization operatives |
| 9. Austria (Vienna) | |



Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide: This is the terrorist organization of Dashnak. Its aspiration is an independent, free and united Armenian state. It is headquartered in the United States.

Key:


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|--|--|
| 1. JCAG; headquarters: United States (Los Angeles) | 4. Training camp: Paris--Schelette village |
| 2. Press organ | 5. France |
| 3. Executive Committee | 6. Affiliate branches |



New Armenian Resistance Organization: This organization, headquartered in Paris, is number three in the Armenian terrorist field. It emerged for the first time in Paris in 1977. It is socialist in orientation.

Key:


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|--|-----------------------|
| 1. NARO; headquarters: Paris | 5. Portugal (Lisbon) |
| 2. Press organ (unknown) | 6. Affiliate branches |
| 3. Executive Committee | 7. Operatives |
| 4. Training camp: Paris--Schelette village | |



Armenian Liberation Army: This organization, headquartered in Beirut, is directed by Syrian Armenians. It has organizations in several countries, including the Soviet Union and Greece.

Key:

1. ALA; headquarters: Beirut
2. Administrative Committee
3. France (Paris)
4. Britain (London)
5. Sweden (Stockholm)
6. United States (Los Angeles)
7. Denmark (Copenhagen)
8. USSR (Erivan)
9. Greece (Athens)
10. Organization operatives



Armenian Youth Assault Organization: This organization, headquartered in Beirut, is directed either by the diocese with which the Armenian churches are affiliated or it is under direct church guidance. It is organized particularly well in Algeria, Spain and West Germany.

Key :

1. AYA0; headquarters: Beirut
2. Press organ: (The Awakening)
3. Executive Committee
4. Training camp: Acar village on the Beirut-Damascus highway
5. Affiliate branches
6. West Germany (Stuttgart)
7. Algeria (Oran)
8. Spain (Madrid)
9. Operatives

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation--which is the meaning of Dashnak--was founded in 1890 by Krisdapor Mikaelian and his friends in Tiflis. Garo Sasuni is the president of this party, which today has its general headquarters in Beirut and the United States. Moreover, apart from JCAG, Dashnak affiliates include numerous subsidiaries, youth organizations, religious centers and assistance organizations. One of the party's leaders, Aprahan Ashjian heads the party's security forces. Ashjian, who assertedly has not been seen since 13 January 1983, was the general commander of all Dashnak-affiliated organizations. Dashnak president Sasuni is a fanatic Armenian who works with priests of the Antilyas Catholicate and who dreams of establishing an independent Armenian state on Turkish soil in conjunction with Soviet Armenia. The U.S. headquarters of the Dashnak Party is the Young Armenian Organization (to create an international Armenian youth movement) at 175 Mt. Auburn St., Cambridge, Mass. 01238. The party in Brussels is known as the Organization for the Rejuvenation of Armenian Ideals, located at Avenue d'Auderghem 23B-1040.

The JCAG is the largest and most significant criminal organization of the Dashnak Party. And according to Interpol data, JCAG, when necessary, arranges "death operations" using paid operatives. Karl (Kalust) Barsamian is the president of this Armenian organization, which has its general headquarters in Los Angeles on Istanbul Armenians Street. The JCAG, which has a weekly magazine called YEREVAN, the official mouthpiece of the group, makes use of a camp in the vicinity of Schelette village 40 kilometers from Paris which belongs to another Armenian terrorist organization, the NARO. The camp is used to train their operatives.

Organization head Barsamian is 65; he immigrated from Turkey to the United States and resides in California. He is short, rather thin, dark complected and wears glasses. An Armenian named Varijan Kilijian is his deputy.

The JCAG treasurer is Sarkis Inknadosian. Elizabeth, known as Liza, has reportedly assumed responsibility for the armed propaganda unit which notifies the press of actions carried out by the organization. (Elizabeth's last name has not been determined.)

JCAG's most important foreign center is Paris. This unit, at an address known as the Armenian House, is directed by Levon Bilihian. Ohannes Gabonian is his deputy. We shall point out here other revelations available at present on this organization but stress that our investigation of other JCAG centers is continuing.

The Paris headquarters of the ALO is the Paris Armenian House. Moreover, the head of this locale, which is also the Paris headquarters of JCAG, is Zaven Yagevian. Yagevian is the director of the Armenian House. He is tall, light complected, has thick black hair and dark eyes. The fingers on Yagevian's right hand shorten from left to right. He is married to a French woman.

The centers and directors of the organization in other countries are:
Longon: This branch, directed by a 50-year-old, Beirut-born Armenian named Ardion Sarkisian, is active in Armenian student unions.

Stockholm: Nezaret Nazarian heads this branch with Bogos Hagopian as deputy. Nazarian is 45 and hails from Aleppo. He is of average height, slightly built, wears glasses, has black hair, weakly looking and light complected. He is a lawyer in Sweden.

The ALO has two branches in the United States. A Damascene Armenian named Serop Kaltakdjian runs the Los Angeles branch on Armenians Street. He is short, pudgy and so dark complected as to be virtually black. He has a restaurant at 4065 Government St., Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

The organization's second center is in San Francisco. A 50-year-old grocer named Suren Kahvecian directs this branch. He is married with two children. His brother Harutyun has become his deputy.

The Denmark branch is run from Copenhagen by Levon Semercian. This role is filled in Athens by Yusuf Akramidis (Akramian). The Soviet branch is in Yerevan. An Armenian named Hrach Sivacian heads this branch which the Yerevan Foreign Student Union uses as its headquarters.

Key members and other officials of the ALO are:

Kirkor Degirmencian: Age 35; born in Aleppo and lives in Beirut; a doctor receiving his medical training in Yerevan; father's name is Nerses.

Vaje Erigian: Age 30; Lebanese citizen; engineering graduate from the Yerevan Polytechnic School; presently resides in the United States.

Rupen Airen Mirza: Age 33; resides in Syria; graduate of the Yerevan School of Construction Engineering.

Sarkis Sermanukian: Age 32; architect.

Harutin Malakian: Age 32; resides in Beirut; does car repair; speaks Armenian and Arabic; average height, darkish in complexion, dark eyes, black hair; brother Avedis is studying in Yerevan.

Harut Yerigian: Age 50; originally from Beirut; short, pudgy, red cheeks.

Toros Varbadian: Age 38; short, pudgy, light complected, dark eyes.

NARO, which ranks third among Armenian terrorist organizations is headquartered in Paris. A rug merchant named Harutin Balian heads the organization. NARO first made its name known with the 14 May 1977 bombing of the Turkish Tourism Bureau in Paris and had wanted to rocket the Turkish Consulate in Marseilles to commemorate "Black April."

Balian is 60, rather tall, pudgy, is light complected and has dark eyes; his deputy is Samvel Manushakian. Manushakian, who is 55 and a pharmacy owner, has thick white hair, is slightly built and, like his leader, is tall.

NARO is located at Rue Blue No 107, Paris. Abraham Kostanian heads its executive committee while Rupen Safarian is treasurer. Damascene Levon Yakupian, age 60, is the fifth member of the executive committee.

NARO, which has a socialist orientation, has committed a total of 10 bombings to date. NARO, whose name hit the papers most recently for bomb attacks against Turkish businesses in Dortmund on 24 April 1982, has its training camp near Schelette village, 40 kilometers from its general headquarters. Outside of the executive committee, the organization's best known operative is Dr Viken Aleksanian. Aleksanian is Syrian born with Lebanese citizenship and resides in the village where the training camp is located. And the organization has occasionally announced in its communiques that, when necessary, it cooperates with ASALA.

NARO's most important subsidiary institution is the All Armenian Philanthropic Society (AAPS) in Lisbon. A man named Aram heads this society. The society has links with the Committee for Relations with Armenians Abroad located in the Soviet Union. This link is maintained through the Armenians Vartkes Ramazian and Sargsian.

Although the AAPS is headquartered in Lisbon, it is much better organized in Syria. The Syrian branch here is in Aleppo under Levon Berhudian. Organization secretary is Vartk Seropian, treasurer is Jirayr Muradian with Kevork Hagopian and Sargsian as members. An Armenian named Avedis heads the Damascus branch with Sargsian as treasurer. Tatyos Tatyostan runs the Kamish branch while Sargsian runs the Latakia branch with Rita Loshikian as secretary.

One of the active Armenian organizations headquartered in the United States is the Armenian Brothers Party. Although this party appears to be independent, it is another arm of NARO with branches in nine countries. Gregus Atamian heads the Paris branch, Serop Balian the St. Lazzaro Island (Italy) branch, Davit Manukian the Geneva branch, Jirayr Vartian the Vienna branch, Ohannes Manukian the Beirut branch, AAPS head Aram the Lisbon branch, Ardion Sarkisian the London branch, and Sarkis Sarkisian the Sydney branch. The Armenian Brothers Party has only two branches in Syria. Krikor Alpigatian heads the one in Aleppo and Yagupian the one in Damascus.

Since the emergence of the Armenian cause, the largest role has fallen to the priests. The actions they have undertaken have attained such dimensions as to constitute not just a violation of religious humanitarianism but a transgression against all mankind. Both the Armenian church and its seminaries have become nests of an unsurpassed hatred of the Turk, spreading malice and hatred.

Today there are five major and important religious sites that can be characterized as centers for activities against the Turkish enemy.

The most important of these is the patriarchate in Soviet Armenia. This place is known as the Holy Ejmiatzin Catholicate and is completely under the control of the KGB. It is the general headquarters of the Lusavorichagan (Gregorian) denomination. Ejmiatzin, which is regarded as the paramount religious center, is directly guiding Soviet-backed Armenian actions against Turkey.

The second center is the Antilyas Catholicate in Lebanon. This Catholicate is of the Gregorian denomination and the Catholicos himself is invested with the title Prince of Cilicia. This religious center, which is acknowledged as a major patriarchate, is subsidized by American Armenians. And its priests are known for introducing propaganda into Turkey and holding demonstrations.

The Migirtarist Catholic Patriarchate is an institution subordinate to the Papacy. This religious center established by the founder of the Armenian movement, Father Migirtar, is on a small island off Venice known as St. Migirtar Island. This patriarchate also has a branch in Vienna. It plays a leading role in stirring up provocations against Turkey.

The Armenian Catholic Patriarchate in Beirut is an active religious center affiliated with the Vatican. There are close ties between the patriarchate and a head of state who is a recognized patron of international terrorism.

The Jerusalem Patriarchate and the Jerusalem Seminary under it are important centers for the training of anti-Turkish clerics. In particular, homeless Armenian and Assyrian children in Turkey are gathered up and sent to this school. After a two-step period of instruction, these children, having been inculcated with a hatred of Turks, are used in various activities.

The priest Hayko Eldemir was sentenced to 14 years in prison for actions against Turkey following his Istanbul Martial Law Court trial. He is a Turkish citizen who had been sent to this school at a young age. He subsequently became an instructor and rose to be assistant director.

Other Orthodox and Protestant patriarchates beyond these religious centers occupy important places in Armenian terrorism. Besides missionary work, these religious centers are in contact with terrorist organizations or youth organizations and philanthropic bodies that subsidize such organizations.

Finally, the AYAO in Beirut is either under the diocese to which it is affiliated through the Arashnortaran Armenian church or it is under the guidance of the church itself. The daily paper ZARTONK is the organization's official mouthpiece. Its training camp is located near the Beirut village of Ancar on the Damascus highway.

The head of the AYAO is age 40, a Beirut native, of average height and build with blue eyes.

The deputy is Shahe Kasarcian. A Beirut native age 35, Kasarcian is tall, pudgy, has slanted eyes and black hair.

Sarkis Iskenian is the executive committee secretary. Iskenian, who works as a health officer in a Beirut hospital, is a Turk hater age 30, short, slightly built and has a rather large head.

Other having membership are Akam Bejeriklian and Kevork Torosian. Bejeriklian is 29, of average height, slightly built, dark complected with black hair. Torosian is 25, of average height, well built, has chestnut hair and blue eyes.

The AYAO has a branch in Stuttgart run by Helen, a teacher in the local Armenian school. Josef Sanusian heads the Oran branch in Algeria. He works in a metallurgy factory, is age 35 and was born in Algeria. Sanusian's brother Herch is a shoemaker in Damascus. The Spanish branch is under 36-year-old Setrak Burunsuzian, a film director.

One of AYAO's key members is Yeghia Keshishian, who is from Aleppo and repairs cars in Beirut. He is short, slightly built with sparse black hair. Ohannes Aharunian is 40 and lives in Aleppo.

CSO: 3554/1

MINISTER WANTS SPECIAL COMPANY TO IMPORT NATURAL GAS FROM USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Sep 83 p 24

[Text] In the opinion of Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine (Social Democrat), there is reason to seriously consider founding a special import company to accelerate the use of natural gas. According to Laine's plans, aside from Neste [state oil company] both the present and new potential users of gas could be shareholders in this company.

Laine would especially like to attract towns that have been considering using gas. These are, for example, Helsinki and Tampere, both of which will soon have to decide what source of energy they will in future resort to.

In Laine's opinion, we ought to do everything we can now to obtain a decision on gas in the course of this year. In the second half of November the matter will again be considered at a Finnish-Soviet Economic Commission meeting.

In the opinion of Neste general manager Jaakko Ihamiotila, the founding of a separate natural gas company might be justified as a natural gas marketing company for Neste in order to dispel familiar prejudices. Laine argued for his own proposal by pointing to those same prejudices.

Ihamiotila, however, was a bit surprised at the timing for opening a discussion on the founding of a new company because there are already representatives of all the different factions on the natural gas committee appointed by the economic commission. "If they, nevertheless, want to discuss the matter, Neste is ready to do so," Ihamiotila asserted.

Hard to Preserve Export Volume

In future Finland will run into serious difficulties with its exports to the Soviet Union unless the volume of Soviet imports can at the same time be assured. In these respects the prospects are not very bright since it was even difficult to come up to current import volumes in negotiating next year's trade agreement.

Speaking at the economic administrators' morning coffee session on Tuesday, Laine doubted that people have yet fully realized the necessity of guaranteeing imports. According to Laine, the prevailing view in many firms seems to be "that, of course, someone will always take care of the necessary imports."

According to Laine, they are even guilty of this in some state companies where new production volume has been developed in the belief that products can be marketed in the Soviet Union.

Concern over imports is, in Laine's opinion, when all is said and done too often left to the care of trade officials and politicians.

At the present time Finland's surplus in trade with the Soviet Union is 452 million rubles. In addition to that, at the end of last year 300 million rubles were transferred from the surplus to a special account at the Bank of Finland. Trade between the two countries should, therefore, balance out at about 5.6 billion markkas.

According to Laine, they at least have no intention of extending the use of the special account as a temporary solution to the problems of balancing trade. "We are certainly now working on the assumption that we will get rid of the account in a couple of years' time."

The next time there will be negotiations on Soviet trade will be in Helsinki on 20 September when Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister A.N. Manzhulo is to arrive in Finland.

Bidding on Phase Four of Svetogorsk Plant

Laine views the future of construction exports in a particularly dim light since the trade imbalance just does not offer any hope for new major projects. They are expecting a decision on the Tallinn port contract that has been under consideration for a long time now in a half a year's time.

Aside from the port of Tallinn, Laine mentioned renovation of the Viipuri cellulose plant and construction of the fourth phase of the Svetogorsk plant as possible new contracts.

At Finn-Stroi, among others, they at present estimate the bid on the Svetogorsk project at about a billion markkas. It will take several months more to prepare the bid.

The main item during the fourth phase of the Svetogorsk project will be the construction of a waste paper plant.

Chairman During the Next Few Weeks

With the approach of the commission meeting at the end of November, the choice of the Finnish partner's new chairman for the commission is also becoming a timely matter. "In its discussions the government has adopted the position on the matter that the new chairman must be a member of the Council of State," Laine said.

As far as is known, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa (Social Democrat) is the strongest candidate for the new chairman's seat. The second alternative is for the foreign trade minister in office at any given time to head the commission.

Among other reasons, this alternative has been criticized because continuity of function would suffer when the government changes hands. Laine does not feel that this is a very serious drawback. He reminded us that Esko Rekola (independent) was foreign trade minister for one very long continuous stretch even though governments changed hands.

They plan to choose the new Finnish chairman well ahead of the meeting at the end of November.

Foreign Trade Minister Laine has assumed the chairman's duties of Dr Ahti Karjalainen, who was temporarily removed from the commission chairmanship by President Mauno Koivisto.

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CSO: 3617/173

LAMBSDORFF ON UNEMPLOYMENT, GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 2 Sep 83 pp 25-26

[Interview with Otto Lambsdorff by ZEIT reporters Michael Jungblut and Dieter Piel]

[Text] A year after the publication of the "Lambsdorff Paper," the Federal Minister of Economics expresses himself critically on the coalition's work to date: only half a turn?

ZEIT: Count Lambsdorff, just about exactly a year ago your economic policy concept, which finally led to a definite rupture of the social-liberal coalition, was presented to the public by DIE ZEIT as a "manifesto of secession." In a few weeks it will be a year since Helmut Kohl was elected prime minister by a constructive vote of lack of confidence. Has everything been done since then to really accomplish the turn you wanted?

Lambsdorff: When I look back, I think we should have shown more consistency. This does not apply so much to budget policy. Here beyond doubt important steps in the direction of consolidation have been taken. The deficit in the federal budget is being reduced, and structural deficits are being broken down. This goes for many areas of social and economic policy. It also applies to the decrease in the bureaucracy and the reduction of subsidies -- and here I must say that I have been personally affected. The pressure for higher subsidies has been extremely strong in the coal, steel, and shipyard industries.

ZEIT: But still, the consolidation in the budget has not been accomplished as you recommended in your paper. The deficits have been lowered not by the reduction of expenditures, but mainly by the raising of taxes and contributions.

Lambsdorff: That is correct. Besides the increase in the value-added tax, however, it is less the taxes than the duties that have been increased...

ZEIT: ... just recently there was another half percent increase in the contributions to the pension plan.

Lambsdorff: This increase had already been decided upon by the old government. But I am not surprised that not all the suggestions in my paper have been fulfilled one hundred percent. Nor was this my intention, since many of the suggestions were meant as alternatives. Besides this, as you know, many groups in the CDU criticized me sharply at the time. What bothers me, rather, is that unemployment does not stand so clearly in the center of the discussion as it does in my paper.

ZEIT: Is it resignation or simply becoming accustomed to things when many people simply accept over two million unemployed today as a fact?

Lambsdorff: That is a dangerous question. I hesitate at the present time to consider seriously whether people are becoming accustomed to things. But I see this danger, and I think that we must certainly oppose it. For I still hold with what I wrote as a concluding sentence in my paper: If we do not solve the problem of unemployment, there will finally be a crisis of the political system.

ZEIT: Have you found an ally in the minister president of Lower Saxony, Ernst Albrecht?

Lambsdorff: When I read the ideas, I thought that Herr Albrecht had written a Lambsdorff memorial paper. There is nothing to be said against large parts of his presentation. But its conclusions -- above all in tax policy -- seem to me to be incorrect. Just to tax the corporations is too little. There must be a rate reform for all wage and income tax payers.

ZEIT: If you see a danger to the goal of employment in the struggle over nonessential things and in a policy of small entitlements instead of a consistent struggle against incorrect economic development, then the discussions of the past weeks on such entitlements as maternity benefits must really shock you.

Lambsdorff: I don't have to hide the fact that I also said in the cabinet that this promise is wrong. I do not believe it can be financed. To be sure, I am for helping parents raise and educate their children. But when this is based upon arguments about the size and composition of the population, I become skeptical. It is not a good thing in itself that in the year 2000 at least 65 million people will live in the Federal Republic. We cannot fit the birth rate to a falsely constructed and therefore no longer solvent pension system. Instead, elements of a method that ensures the capital must be introduced into the pension plan.

ZEIT: Does this mean that you want to put old age insurance more into the hands of the private sector?

Lambsdorff: I don't want to take it completely out of the public domain. But we must see to it that the system remains fiscally sound. When I look at how the relation between active and retired people will shift in the coming years,

fewer and fewer active people and more and more retired ones must be reckoned with, then it will be time to consider the possibilities you have mentioned.

ZEIT: How much time remains then for the coalition to tackle all these problems in the sense of a turn? After almost a year has gone by, what can be done in consideration of the various coming elections and the beginning of the campaigns?

Lambsdorff: I have nothing against attempts at self-explanation in general outline, as long as one defines oneself correctly and not in such a way that more is promised than can be fulfilled. And here the three parties that make up this government said as early as 6 March that they promise nothing, but rather demand sacrifices from the citizens. This must not be different in state elections, either.

ZEIT: This leads to the theme of subsidies. There can be no talk of reductions, but of the massive new demands from the coal, steel, and shipyard industries. Your refusal up to now to give the suffering shipyards further tax money before a convincing plan has been presented has brought you the criticism from the mayor of Hamburg, Dohnanyi, that you are the "worst economics minister the Federal Republic has ever had." Such expression in the Bremen election campaign...

Lambsdorff: ... Even outside of election campaigns Herr von Dohnanyi is convinced of this. I understand this, because I always took his ideas apart when I was in the Schmidt cabinet -- always in agreement with the previous prime minister, by the way.

ZEIT: Will you not change your position on the shipyards in spite of these aggressive tones?

Lambsdorff: The shipyards expect contract help from Bonn. But since their representatives know the figures as well as I do, they also know that they could not come up to full capacity if they could get all the ship-building orders that were issued in 1983. There are simply too few orders. This is the problem, and not the large share of the Japanese in world ship construction, or the subsidies of the other countries.

ZEIT: The mayor of Bremen, Koschnik, calls your position the "naked ideology of a brutal capitalism."

Lambsdorff: Mr. Koschnik must put a plan on the table before us before the elections on 25 September. This is his decision and not that of the Federal Government.

ZEIT: You seem more ready to reach deeper into the treasury for the coal industry.

Lambsdorff: There is also an important difference here. We decided for energy policy reasons to preserve the one primary energy source that we have available in great amounts in the Federal Republic. This is an argument that fits no other branch of industry to such an extent. But the capacity is greater than the output, and the output is greater than the turnover. The result is that the piles of coal on the Ruhr and the Saar are getting larger each day. This cannot continue.

ZEIT: In the present situation there is always an argument on coal, steel, and shipyards that is used like a crowbar: keeping jobs. It also plays the decisive role in the more and more heated discussions on the shortening of work time. In view of your principles on regulation policy, are you ready to work for general legislative solutions for the shortening of work time?

Lambsdorff: No. A general legislative regulation would of course mean that it would become a fixed part of working regulations that no one could work more than 35 hours a week, or that the workers would be sent home at age 58...

ZEIT: ... as Labor Minister Blum is trying to bring about.

Lambsdorff: No, he won't suggest that -- just as little as a reemployment requirement in the case of jobs becoming free.. He will not introduce any mandatory retirement at 58. He will try to introduce enticements for voluntary retirement.

ZEIT: Which the unions will then possibly make generally binding by wage contract.

Lambsdorff: That is the big question, whether such a legislative possibility can be opened up for a broad wage contract regulation. We must avoid the use of force or psychological pressure at the work place with the motto: "Now it's finally time for you to go home, Dad."

ZEIT: A simple no to all suggestions and demands doesn't lead to a solution, either.

Lambsdorff: I am very much against the trench war mentality of some gentlemen on the employer side who don't want to talk about work time at all. I am for a great deal of flexibility that allows the individual firms and their staffs to find their solutions. This could then be a contribution to the relief of the work market -- but not more. The fanciful figures that are being calculated -- millions of free jobs with the introduction of the 35 hour week, hundreds of thousands with early retirement -- are completely illusory.

ZEIT: But here the Federal Government is just an observer. When I.G. Metall pushes through its demands in a way similar to the introduction of continued wage payment during sickness, you cannot influence this.

Lambsdorff: The battlecry that is now already beginning and that is pointing toward 1 March 1984 -- one hears already, of course, that this is the

beginning of the strike -- is extremely unpleasant. I really wonder how much of the necessary strike preparedness the employers have.

ZEIT: All discussions of more flexible work time instead of a 35 hour week collapse because I.G. Metall bluntly rejects them.

Lambadorff: Unfortunately, the attitude of the Social Democrats is making a relaxation of the fronts more difficult. Right now the SPD is covering up its lack of ideas in industrial policy and in other areas by a concentration on security policy and on what they call the hot fall. The SPD will never agree to deployment according to the NATO dual decision. The SPD no longer has the strength. And when that is over, the next topic will be the 35 hour work week, about which the SPD believes that it can only be held together with the help of their troops. Thus they will stumble from one unrealistic and alien position to the other.

ZEIT: Let's go back to the "turn." Together with the reduction of subsidies, which has not yet taken place, belongs also the turning over of firms owned by the state to the private sector...

Lambadorff: ... Do you mean the purchase of a fish factory in Cuxhaven by the Lower Saxon government?

ZEIT: Not exactly that.

Lambadorff: But this definitely has to be said. Herr Albrecht and Frau Breuel of all people are buying a factory from a large concern.

ZEIT: We were thinking more of the Federal Government.

Lambadorff: I am very much in favor of this, and as far as many firms are concerned, I see no reason why the state should remain the owner.

ZEIT: Together with the great problems that along with armament and unemployment concern people belongs environmental protection and above all the dying of the forests. The suggestion has now come from your party to tax old power plants with the amount of 2,500 marks per ton of sulphur in order to force them to change their technology. A second suggestion is to check all autos twice a year to see that they are obeying the exhaust regulations. How does the economics minister stand on these suggestions?

Lambadorff: I understand that these discussions increase in intensity and sometimes in excitement -- above all when I see the condition of many forests. The forests are dying more quickly than we thought they would. Whether emissions taxes will help here is something we discussed in the Federal Economics Ministry as early as three years ago, and we had several doubts. As far as checking the cars is concerned, I have a strong tendency to consider this to be reasonable -- although it again means more controls and bureaucracy. But many motors are so bad that such a check -- if it can further reasonable requirements -- seems right to me. For it will be a few years before only cars with catalytic converters and lead-free gasoline drive on our roads. If it is right that the forests are dying so quickly, then a quick beginning has to be made.

PAPER COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET BILL

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Sep 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Nation's Economy Is Still Expanding"]

[Text] As expected, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's government has survived its first baptism of fire intact, the drafting of next year's budget proposal. And the SMP [Finnish Rural Party], a government party for the first time, did not produce an unpleasant surprise for Finance Minister Ahti Pekkala either, although because of its earlier appearance it did have to make a peculiar interruption at the end of the week with its demands regarding matters which had already otherwise been agreed on in government circles.

The budget proposal swelled to an annoyingly large one, 84.4 billion markkas. Expenditures will increase fully 13.7 percent in comparison with last fall's proposal, which in turn grew 11 percent over the previous year's. Aside from inflation, the traces of those changes the political decision-makers made before the elections are now evident in the increase. A considerable number of them will really advance development.

Judging from the general approaches the government has now presented, next year's budget will fortunately not entirely stop development either. We will just have to somehow pay for the reforms again. Thus the debt will be increased, the tax rate raised by a half a percent and contributions increased by — we would assume — even more than the goal set in terms of inflation, 6 percent. The new debt will indeed probably not grow at quite the same rate as this year's, but there will certainly be a supplementary budget again.

You don't get reforms for nothing. Thus, while debate over when social security reform should go into effect is not being postponed, which is a good thing, to counterbalance that unpleasant decisions have to be made. Thus pensions will be adjusted only once a year. Insured and employers' contributions will be more costly. Medical and maternity benefits will be cut in accordance with a degressive scale and the portion of expenses the insured has to pay will increase.

The government will also collect more money by extending the sales tax — unpleasant, to be sure — to telephone and telecommunications services as well. Also unpleasant for citizens will be a hike in the fuel tax, one that will

probably affect the consumer's pocketbook. The tax on coal and nuclear power elements will justifiably be raised to the level of the tax on heavy fuel oil. One would think that the electric power companies have enough of a margin to handle the matter without burdening the consumer. Situated in the no man's land of good and bad sides is the 400-markka minimal limit attached to the right to deduct interest paid on loans: Only interest in excess of that figure will be accepted as tax deductible. In connection with this they may in part have been thinking of rather large partial payments, to which the right to deduct will also be extended.

There is good news on the budget too. Aside from the fact that the momentum of the social security reform that has been decided on is being retained, errors committed in the previous pension reform will also be corrected. The partial fulfillment of other election promises also includes proposals for increasing maternity benefits and child subsidies, although the latter will not be increased until October of next year. Subsidies for the home care of children, which will reduce the need for institutional care, will also be increased.

Reason for rejoicing is the fact that the government recognizes the importance of scientific research as a factor in the strengthening of our ability to compete and as a promoter of the national economy. We have nothing but good things to say about the increase in appropriations for research and researchers' activities, just as we have with regard to the fact that industry has finally been granted a special income tax deduction for research.

On the whole the budget proposal is not, as advance information led us to believe, anywhere nearly as black as was to be feared from the evidently expedient picture painted in advance by the government. Real income available for household use even promises to rise by over a percentage point next year. Potential growth will naturally affect different groups of citizens in different ways.

The outcome will also in part depend on the municipalities and municipal alliances. They too will have to switch to a frugal economy and in some places avoid obviously wasteful spending.

Next winter's wage policy decisions, for which the budget does not create a very optimistic basis, will also essentially influence the successful achievement of the government's main economic policy objectives. As yet untested is how the budget proposal will get through Parliament. There the government will be facing a powerful, but split opposition that is scarcely capable of internal cooperation on many issues.

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GOVERNMENT PRESENTS BUDGET BILL WITH CUTS IN SOCIAL SPENDING

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Sep 83 p 6

[Article: "Government Extends a Hand to Pensioners; Social Cuts Eased Up, Taxes Increased, Contributions Go Up"]

[Text] The government abandoned some of the social policy cuts, deferments and freezes planned by the Finance Ministry and eased up on and softened them when the budget proposal for next year was thrashed out on Monday.

Social security reform will not be postponed, rather the next phases of the reform program will be carried out at the stipulated times. Child subsidies will not be frozen next year, rising instead a year from this October. Medical and maternity benefits will not be trimmed through the policy, but larger benefits will be more vigorously reduced than before. The health center contribution will not be reinstated nor will the construction of ARAVA [State Housing Construction Commission] subsidized housing plummet either, as the budget proposal originally indicated they would.

Unlike what the Finance Ministry had planned, rising wages will continue to raise retirement pensions, but in future pensions will be increased only once a year, at the beginning of January. The July increase will be eliminated.

The government's weekend lenience did not extend as far as the municipalities and schools. School reform was postponed for a year, that is, the new school laws will not go into effect until summer 1985. The government also promised that it would not change the hour framework system stipulated in the reform program.

Indifferent to the pleas of the municipal organizations, the government decided to cut the whole range of state aid for the municipalities by 1 percent. According to the government, this does not, however, mean that the municipal economies will be bled.

When the government extended a hand to pensioners and families with children in its budget negotiations, it at the same time slipped its other hand into taxpayers' pocketbooks. Taxes will rise next year. The tax scale will not be adjusted to compensate for the rate of inflation and social security contributions will, on the other hand, be increased. Rising expenditures will also be covered by increasing many other contributions and prices.

Pension Errors Will Be Corrected

The government's main disputes over the budget involved pensions and other aspects of social policy. Agreement was reached when they decided to implement social security reform in the sequence stipulated by Parliament.

Thus phase II B of the reform program will go into effect at the start of the year. Social security pensions will then be distributed on an individual basis. The amount of the pension will be calculated solely on the basis of one's own income. The pension supplement will also then be increased by 52 markkas.

The government promises to correct the much discussed pension errors. Recipients of so-called old-age retirement pensions, whose net pensions were reduced when pensions were subjected to taxation, will receive a small increase in the social security pension supplement. The government has not yet announced the exact amount.

The deduction for disabled pensioners will also be reinstated in the municipal taxation system for 4 years. Pensioners who under the 1982 tax regulations were entitled to a disability deduction will also receive deductions in the same amounts in municipal assessments between 1984 and 1987. No deduction will be allowed for the 1983 tax year.

Pensions Will Be Increased Once a Year

As of next year, social security and retirement pensions will be increased only once a year, at the beginning of January. The second increase will be eliminated. Up until now pensioners have received part of the January increase as an advance in early July, but that advance increase will be terminated. They did not in the end go into a discussion of the bases for increasing retirement pensions.

At the beginning of October 1984 child subsidies will rise by 6 percent and the maternity benefit rate will also slightly rise. In comparison with this year, 10 million markkas more will be provided to support child care in the home. The bases for distributing this subsidy have not yet been decided on.

The government also promises to roughly increase the pensions of those veterans who served at the front who "are worst off economically."

Benefits Will Be Cut

While the Finance Ministry had planned to reduce it to 70 percent, the rate of medical insurance coverage will continue to be 80 percent. However, the rate for maternity benefits in excess of 100 days will continue to be 70 percent until the end of next year. That rate was to have been raised to 80 percent at the start of the year, but the increase has been postponed again.

A new chunk of the biggest benefits will be bitten off next year. The benefit scale will be changed such that benefits will be calculated on the basis of

80 percent of the recipient's daily wage for those with monthly incomes of up to 6,250 markkas, 50 percent for those with incomes ranging between 6,250 and 10,000 markkas and in future only 30 percent for those with wages in excess of 10,000 markkas.

At present the benefit rate is 80 percent for those with monthly incomes of up to 6,000 markkas and those with incomes in excess of that collect 50 percent. Thus the 30-percent limit is new and it will cut out benefits up to now potentially amounting to a couple of thousand markkas.

Minimal Limits on Deductions

While the inflation rate would require an adjustment of about 9 percent, next year an adjustment corresponding to a rise in the level of prices of only 6 percent will be made in the income and property tax tables. So taxes will increase. The new tables will be applied to withholding taxes at the beginning of next March.

The government promises to increase several tax deductions, but not all. A new factor will be introduced to tax deductions, minimal limits, which will produce money for the government, that is, add to citizens' tax burden. Minimal limits will be applied to deductions for medical expenses and interest paid on loans.

For individual taxpayers the minimum for medical expenses will be 200 markkas and 400 markkas for those with families. If one's medical expenses add up to only those amounts, they cannot be deducted for tax purposes at all.

On the other hand, the upper limit for the right to deduct medical expenses will rise from the present 800 markkas to 1,600. Thus, if an individual has medical expenses of, for example, 1,700 markkas next year, he may deduct those 1,700 markkas less 200, or 1,500 markkas.

There will be a minimal limit of 400 markkas on interest deductions too.

Interest on home loans in excess of that figure may be deducted up to 25,000 markkas. Interest on anything but home loans may be deducted up to no more than 10,000 markkas.

There Will Be a Telecommunications Tax, Stamp Tax Will Rise

As early as a year ago industrial firms got a much discussed deduction in their national taxes for research expenses. On the other hand, telephone expenses for both firms and individuals will increase when the sales tax is extended to phone calls and telecommunications services.

The tax on electricity will rise by 0.1 penni a kilowatt hour and the stamp tax on loans will rise from 1.2 to 1.5 percent. The stamp tax on official documents will also rise, but the fees for a passport and a driver's license will remain unchanged.

Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Will Soon Be More Expensive

The prices of alcoholic beverages and tobacco will probably rise as soon as this fall. The amounts of the increases and exactly when they are to go into effect are still being kept secret so that people will not start stockpiling them. They will probably increase in price by about 5 percent.

The fuel tax will rise by an average 5 percent and it will result in rises of the same size in the price of gasoline, among other fuels. Coal will become more expensive than oil when the tax on it is raised to the level of the oil tax.

Train ticket prices will rise twice: by about 5 percent at the start of the year and 6 percent in early June. Freight rates will rise by 8 percent at the beginning of the year.

Postal fees will rise by an average 9 percent at the beginning of March and newspaper delivery charges by 8 percent as early as the beginning of the year. The classification of first-class mail will be revised.

The fact that reductions in social security contributions are to be withdrawn from both employees and employers will in part increase taxes next year.

The insured's social security pension premium will rise from 1.75 pennia per tax unit to 1.95 and the medical insurance premium from 1 penni to 1.20 per tax unit. Employers' social security contributions will rise by a total of 0.2 of a percentage point. These increases will produce a total of over 700 million markkas.

Party Subsidy Will Not Be Increased

The effect of the SMP's [Finnish Rural Party] presence in the government can be seen in the budget inasmuch as party subsidies and subsidies for party organs will not be increased next year and special subsidies for party institutes will be eliminated. Funds for leisure time organizations will be retained in the budget, but the conditions governing their use will be tightened up on.

The sum of 1.128 billion markkas will be provided for development aid. Finland's contribution to such aid will rise from 0.36 to 0.4 of a percent this year. The goal for this decade is 0.7 percent of the GNP.

The Army will be granted 1.141 billion in procurement appropriations. Among others, it will get used Draken fighters for Pirkkala Airfield. Eight million were snatched from the procurement funds and recruits will get a 1-markka increase in their per diem allowance as of 1 October 1984.

Construction on 19,000 new ARAVA housing units, or 2,000 less than this year, will start next year. The social guarantee for young people will change from an experiment to a permanent affair.

The new government assistance system for social welfare and health care, the so-called Great Reform, will go into effect on schedule at the beginning of next year, but government aid scales for social services will also drop just as the scales for schools and libraries will.

The government is borrowing 10.7 billion to balance this budget, which will come to a grand total of 84.4 billion.

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GOOD HARVEST EXPECTED, SHOULD AID OVERALL ECONOMIC UPTURN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Sep 83 p 29

[Text] Thanks to the good weather, the grain harvest has now progressed rapidly and fall grain crops have been almost completely threshed. The Agricultural Centers Association reports that barley and oats are still being threshed and they are now quickly harvesting spring wheat and turnips.

The harvest looks fairly good. In terms of both quantity and quality it is very reminiscent of last year's. Diseases to a certain extent reduced the wheat yield, but the barley harvest was also smaller than expected in Hame and Eastern Finland.

They got around to fall planting earlier this year than before. They will begin planting fall wheat in just the next few days.

A moderate potato harvest will be obtained, in some places even a good one, since the weather was also favorable for potatoes. The harvest is, however, only in the initial stage.

Frosts during the first half of August really hit the potato stalks so hard in Keski-Pohjanmaa, among other places, that a third of the edible potato crop in the area was lost.

The quality of the potatoes is particularly good. So far fairly little disease has appeared. The potato crop has been most troubled by scabiness due to a dry summer's end, as was the case last year.

Sugar beets have in general been thriving, but the summer's end dryness has already reduced the crop. The herb crop also needs water now.

Because there was so little rain in August, fresh growth and pasturage have stopped growing. Similarly, many farmers did not get a third feed harvest for storage. In Northern Finland, on the other hand, meadow grass had continued to grow well thanks to more abundant rains.

A moderate harvest of seed grass will be obtained again this year, even though the red clover and timothy crops are still in part unharvested. They expect to have a rather poor harvest in Varsinais-Suomi and Hame, areas where red clover is the main crop.

Flood of Grain Sales

In the position paper it published on Wednesday the Agricultural Producers Association (MTK) demands that the target price agreed on for grain be paid despite the flood of grain sales. The MTK says that grain buyers must in other respects too observe the rules, that is, pay freight costs to those growers who themselves ship their grain to the collection point.

The association emphasizes that grain buyers may not exploit the temporary flood of grain sales and try to destroy the approved pricing system.

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UPTURN GAINING SPEED WITH INCREASE IN GNP

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Sep 83 p 29

[Article by Kristiina Ritvos: "On the Course of Industrial Growth: Production Jumps to an Impressive Rate of Growth"]

[Text] During the early part of this summer industrial production jumped at a surprisingly impressive rate of speed. The growth that began in April continued through May and June. It would seem that Finland is finally firmly on the course of growth.

The industrial production volume index measured by Statistics Center shows a growth rate of 4.7 percent (point score 112) in June by comparison with June of last year, which was also a quite good month.

The growth thus begun continued with a certain measure of certainty through July as well, albeit the month it was compared with, July of last year, was a rather poor one. Now we are primarily excited as to whether this growth can continue at the same rate later into the fall too.

At least the number of economic forecasts reported by HELSINGIN SANOMAT is certainly right now growing at a steady rate of not quite 10 percent.

Industry itself has in its own economic barometer predicted a leveling off of growth in early fall and an acceleration not before the end of the year.

In the fall the metal industry in particular should dive if predictions hold true. So far the metal industry has remained on the plus side and even recorded a 2.5-percent growth rate for the first half of the year. To be sure, the shipyards have just announced that their last ships have now been exported and production is coming to an end.

Another important branch of the metal industry, the machine industry, does not, on the other hand, feel that it is in any way getting ready for a downturn. Its growth rate just accelerated during the second quarter of the year.

The metal industry as a whole even recorded a 2.9-percent growth rate in June and attained a point score of 128.8.

As for the lumber industry, production rose quite impressively in June at a rate of 14.2 percent (point score 101.9). The overall growth rate for the first half of the year was barely in excess of 5 percent.

The lumber industry's growth rate at present seems to be quite stable. After all, a growth rate of over 10 percent has now been recorded for it over a period of 3 months.

Growth Rate of Almost 2 Percent for First Half of the Year

As things look now, we can bet that the 1-percent growth in industrial production predicted for this year will be exceeded. After all, the rate for the first half of the year is already 1.9 percent. There may be surprises only if the metal industry really takes a dive at the end of the year. But it probably itself believes that there will be a gradual recession for the time being.

In their own way consumer goods production figures also report better times, although they are still gloomy and smaller than a year ago. The degree of distress has, however, spread in the clothing and shoe industries, among others. Exceptionally this year among the textile industries, things have gone better for the clothing industry.

Statistics Center has once again published the revised and reconsidered figures for last year. According to them, 1982 is and will continue to be a growth year, whether the new spokesman for industry thinks so or not.


The growth rate is estimated to be 1.1 percent and it will no longer change by much. The figure that is now estimated is based on data on from 70 to 80 percent of industry, although there is still the question of advance information.

Statistics Center believes that the rate of change will be less than half a percent once the final growth figure is obtained next year.

The first data published at the beginning of this year showed that industrial production dropped last year. When it was confirmed this summer that last year was indeed a growth year, the news caused such surprise that Statistics Center has now thoroughly examined its index.


The figures for the first half of the year have also been adjusted upwards. As for this, it was brought on by the changes that occurred in the tobacco and metal industries, among others.

(1) kansantuote



Key:

1. National product.
2. Percentage of change from the preceding year.
3. Estimate.



Key:

1. HELSINGIN SANOMAT index (reported volume).
2. Finland.

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FEARS EXPRESSED OVER PROBABLE TURKISH ECONOMIC SUPERIORITY

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 28 Aug 83 p 4

[Article by Pavlos Kamvysis, "The 'Stupid' Turks And The 'Clever' Greeks"]

[Text] At long last we must stop to cherish certain national illusions we have and which often affect the policies of those in government. One of these illusions is that we, the Greeks, are a "clever" people, more clever than other people. If we compared ourselves with the Argentinians, the Greenlanders, or the inhabitants of Sri-Lanka, the matter would not be important. They would be alright and we, the clever ones, would live happily ever after. But when we compare ourselves with people whose course, behavior, and quality may possibly play a decisive role in the survival of the Greek nation, then the issue is something else again.

These thoughts were provoked by two articles on Turkey published in the last issue of the ECONOMIST. The article reconfirms what many here in Greece believe happens to be a gigantic illusion--namely, that the Greeks are "superior" and the Turks are "stupid".

The Turks are not stupid at all. That's the truth as proved by facts. While we here do everything we can to weaken and disorganize our economy (and of course for this the present government is not only responsible) Turkey is developing at a fast pace into an economic giant.

The Investments

Particularly impressive is the record in the sector of foreign investments. We all know that in Greece this sector is virtually immobilized. By contrast, in Turkey investments show a vertical rise. According to a study by OECD titled "Foreign Investments in Turkey; Paris 1983," foreign investors have overcome their fears regarding the behavior of the Turkish businessmen, banks and the government. They discovered that their applications easily found their way to implementation, the banks moved swiftly and the Turkish businessmen with remarkable adjustability quickly grasped the essence of the game.

At this point it is necessary to note something which shows how serious and clever these individuals are who--under any regime--are the elite, the Turkish establishment. The Turkish government not only left free the private

initiative but supported it in every way. It only kept for itself certain sectors it considered as having strategic significance. These are the enterprises TASKAN (machinery), TEMSA (electrical tools, turbines), TEKTAS (electronics), TUSAS (aircraft and helicopters), and TUMOSAN (diesel engines). It should be noted that even in these cases the Turkish government quickly stated that it welcomes the cooperation of foreigners without, at the same time, prohibiting the participation of Turkish private capital.

But there is more. The Turkish government establishes priorities in investments. Every year it drafts a list of investments in which it is interested and which can bring the benefits provided by the development legislation. In drafting the list the government takes into account the industries the country needs, the geographic location in relation to the industrial development of the regions, and the volume of the exported produced goods. It is mentioned characteristically that in 1982 there were plans to establish 178 new industrial enterprises in the processing sector. Included were 29 for food processing plants, 9 for lumber, 5 for paper, 26 for chemicals, 2 for glass, 10 for iron and steel, 10 for chassis, 13 for electronics, 3 for cement, and 19 for electrical appliances.

The...Criminals

Here in Greece, possessed as we obviously are by a suicidal complex, we are trying to blow the Greek industry sky high. We do everything we can to bring it to its knees. We look at the Greek industrialists as though they were criminals because they try to make a profit from their work. And because they have nice homes, nice cars and often a yacht. All this seems to be a sin. And for this reason the businessmen must "go to hell."

Openings

But the Turks do not limit their activities to Turkey. They feel strong enough to branch out abroad. British journalist David Tong, writing in the ECONOMIST, said that currently Turkish construction companies have contracts worth 13 billion dollars in the Middle East and Africa. The Turkish technical companies are among the largest international entities.

We remind the reader that the erstwhile powerful Greek technical companies are virtually all--except one--in terrible economic condition. Giants like "SKAPANEVS" or EDOK-ETEP face a problem of survival.

We add that the Turkish companies are moving forward, being called by Arab countries as supervisors on projects being constructed by European companies. Moreover, the workers of these Turkish companies send back home remittances worth 150 million dollars.

I will not say anything today about the four Turkish enterprises for the production of automobiles, nor about the purchase of Greek freighters, nor the rise in Turkish tourism. We will talk about this another time...

Braggards

This is the reality which tells us what we the clever Greeks are doing and what is being accomplished quietly, methodically and consistently by the Turkish people.

Conclusion:

It is time to stop our self-congratulations and self-satisfaction.

It is time we stop being amateurs, braggards and stupid.

It is time we stop playing with our own fate--the fate of Hellenism.

If nothing else let us take seriously into account that--according to international economic organizations--Turkey will have a population of 70 million by the end of this century, while we, the way we go, will have approximately 12 million. Let us think about it and what it means.

7520

CS0: 3521/439

OTE, DEI LOANS: FOREIGN BONDS CONTEMPLATED

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 27 Aug 83 p 8

/Text/ Despite the superficial pretense that the government does not worry about the course of our foreign exchange reserves, it nonetheless worries so much about their serious decline that it plans to float a bond issue abroad (among Greek emigrants and others) while increasing its public borrowing.

In the next few weeks we will borrow from abroad (from British, American and Japanese banks mainly) through the Telecommunications Organization /OTE/ at first and then through the Public Power Corporation /DEI/ approximately 600 million dollars.

Specifically, Minister of National Economy Ger. Arsenis stated yesterday that OTE sought a loan of 200 million dollars but received offers for 330 million, a fact which shows the credit of our country abroad remains high. (Note: He did not explain whether we would take the 330 million dollars, but most likely this will be the case.)

Responding to a question by AKROPOLIS, Arsenis confirmed that next week DEI too will start looking abroad for a loan of 250 million dollars. Thus, instead of the government, the loans of 600 million dollars will be taken by OTE and DEI which is the same thing.

But while Arsenis was announcing the above, stating also that with the DEI loan public borrowing for 1983 will come to an end, he introduced a bill in the Chamber of Deputies which enables the Bank of Greece--for the first time since the beginning of this century--to issue bonds to be sold abroad.

But, regardless of how successful such a loan would be, the effort itself shows how serious the country's foreign exchange situation is. Moreover, Arsenis denied categorically yesterday that we are going to receive a loan from the EEC through the European Monetary System. He explained that to receive such a loan it is not necessary to join first the System. (Note: AKROPOLIS had already written about these matters last week.)

7520

CS0: 3521/439

CONTRACTORS SEE FAILURE TO REACH EXPORT GOALS AS CAUSE OF INFLATION

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 18 Aug 83 p 3

/Text/ Exporters maintain that the inflation rate has increased as a result of the failure to reach export figures targeted for the first 6 months of 1983. Ercument Kilicbay, member of the board of the Union of Turkish Construction and Installation Contractors and an official at Nuroi Construction and Commerce Company, maintains that present monetary policies have led to a contraction of the domestic market, which in turn led to lower production levels that could not be increased through exports, thus creating inflationary effects. Exporters who answered questions posed by DUNYA on subjects such as the drop in the level of exports compared with the same period last year, the probable causes of the drop and its probable effects on the Turkish economy, complained bitterly about the increase in the inflation rate. Admitting that while the drop in exports had something to do with world markets, the exporters noted that it originated from Turkey's own unique conditions, drawing attention to the effects of the bureaucracy, technical shortcomings and ingrained habits concerning exports. Ercument Kilicbay, whose credentials have been noted above, pointed out that apart from developments on a global scale, a most important factor behind the drop in exports is the "Turkish exporters lack of adequate know-how in commercial matters." He said:

"The attainment of stability in exporting is predicated on the establishment of a commercial code of ethics. The Turks, as a people, have not been able to learn commerce. We have to learn it in a very short time. It is also necessary that changes be made without delay in matters of principle as well as in regulations. To institute better principles of exporting we might adopt the example of those countries with proven export performance. Furthermore, certain deficiencies at a practical level have hampered the achievement of export targets. Turkey's exports experienced substantial losses due to inadequacies in quality control even where production has, in the main, conformed to standards."

Kilicbay, who maintained that the biggest single outcome of the drop in exports on the economy was the rise in the inflation rate, added that "exports, which contribute so much to the balance of payments, are also an important factor when it comes to maintaining equilibrium in the domestic market." Kilicbay noted that due to the monetary policies presently employed, domestic consumption was brought down and this has led to a lowering of production. He also noted that as exports dropped, production levels gradually came down, which is another factor fanning the flames of inflation.

Gazanfer Ozcan, member of the board of the Surtas Pressed Metal Co, Ltd, pointed out that the drop in exports was largely due to the Iran-Iraq war. He added:

"Last year, 50 percent of Turkey's exports went to Iran and Iraq. The restrictions on their imports brought on by the war produced a situation unfavorable to our exports. We have to maintain good relations with these two countries if our economic interests are to be served."

12466

CSO: 3554/409

BILL ENVISIONS BROADENED FINANCE MINISTRY POWERS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 18 Aug 83 p 1

/Text/ It is expected that the proposed governmental directive concerning the organization and functions of the Ministry of Finance will be discussed at the cabinet meeting today. The proposal envisions the expansion of the ministry's formal powers and an increase in its effectiveness. It also establishes, within the structure of the ministry, a council for research, planning and coordination. In the proposal, it is said that "The Finance Ministry conducts studies concerning the formulation and administration of financial and economic policies."

The clause that specifies the functions of the ministry in the proposed governmental directive, which is aimed at changing the organizational chart of the ministry and will abolish the present Bill 2996 concerning the organization and functions of the Ministry of Finance, reads as follows:

"The Ministry of Finance conducts studies concerning the formulation and administration of financial and economic policies and collects all state revenues, be they from tax or nontax sources. It is responsible for affairs concerning the treasury, money, credit, cash movement and the internal and external debt of the state. It prepares the state budget, supervises its administration and keeps the accounts of the state. In legal disputes to which the state is a party, it employs its right and authority to represent the state. It prepares and participates in the preparation of draft legislation relating to revenue, expenditures and treasury affairs. It carries out the functions that are imparted to the Ministry of Finance in various laws."

In the proposed governmental directive, the main service units are envisioned as follows: the office of the chief legal advisor and directorate of judicial matters; the office of the budget, financial control and public accounts; the office of revenues; the office of the treasury and international economic corporation; the directorate of national property; and the directorate of the mint and the official seal. The advisory and control units of the ministry are envisioned as follows: the inspectors council; the council of financial analysts; the council of banking auditors; the comptrollers council; the council for research, planning and coordination; advisors to the ministry; and the secretariat for civil defense. The functions and authorities of the council for research, planning and coordination that is to be established by the governmental directive are as follows:

"It determines the methods to be used in the execution of the orders and duties given to the ministry in government programs, 5-year development plans, annual programs, decisions of the Council of Ministers and the national security policy. It provides assistance in the preparation of the ministry's general policy and its program of public service in line with the above premises. It is responsible for ensuring that principles of scientific research are observed in the determination of the ministry's long-term plans and the 5-year development plan, in the selection of services and measures that are to be accorded priority in the annual programs and in the determination of fundamental policies relating to these. After securing the approval of the minister, it sends these studies to the State Planning Organization; and it prepares the annual agenda of the ministry, during which it cooperates with the general secretariat of the ministry. It identifies the problems, shortcomings and bottlenecks encountered during application of the development plans and programs and the ministry's annual programs (in both routine and followup stages) and finds ways and means of removing these obstacles at an interministerial level."

Discontent Among the Auditors

The proposal also contains measures that entail the dispersal of auditors to various regions with the title of "revenue inspector," creating discontent among this group.

The proposed change would mean that auditors, who until now have functioned as a centralized body and had overseeing powers, are going to be appointed as regional inspectors, which entails a sort of demotion. It is pointed out that if this arrangement gets the approval of the Council of Ministers and becomes law, monitoring capacity will be curtailed. The present figure for monitoring, which stands at three percent might go down to one percent as a result of the new system.

12466

CSO: 3554/409

PRL'S MICHEL ON RELATIONS WITH CVP

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 31 Aug 83 pp 26-27

[Interview with PRL (Liberal Reform Party) Chairman Louis Michel by Johan Struye:
"What Exactly Does that CVP (Social Christian Party) Want?" on 25 Aug 83]

[Text] Last Thursday morning Chairman Louis Michel (3) of the Liberal Reform Party returned from vacation in Tunisia. Immediately he summoned the heads of the party by telegram for a special meeting the next day, Friday. The only point on the agenda: What is the meaning of the increasing tension of the CVP with respect to the 1984 budget proposal? [Following is] A discussion which took place last Thursday afternoon.

Louis Michel: I can only conclude that the CVP's attitude has once again completely changed in less than a month's time. It is not exactly a loyal attitude. We are living in a system of political alliance. When the partners come to an accord in the lap of the government, then that is necessarily a compromise. But an alliance is no longer possible when the partners do not abide by the accords which were agreed upon. Even if basically I agree with Chairman Swaelen that there isn't enough budgetary reform, his attitude still reminds me of the football player who sits on the ball for the entire match and afterward blames his partners for not making enough scores. If Frank Swaelen needs more reforms, he should first of all approach his ministers. We have made proposals, amongst others for Social Security. It isn't a secret to anyone that primarily the christian democratic ministers --and not only the Flemish ones-- have rejected those profound reforms. I don't understand. Either Frank Swaelen had not been too well informed during his stay in the United States on what was happening in the government, or we are in the midst of a wave of speculation and strategy. As partner of the CVP we should then ask the question whether that party isn't once again living with nostalgia for its previous socialist allies.

[Question] Moral objections, said Frank Swaelen. That sounds heavy coming from a christian democrat.

Michel: It takes nerve to speak of moral objections to tax amnesty but not to feel those moral objections when it is a matter of amnesty for political delinquents. I would certainly like an explanation of where the CVP draws the moral line. Some of those political delinquents for whom the CVP is asking amnesty have killed people.

I also call those who commit tax fraud political delinquents, but as far as I know they have never set up gas chambers.

[Question] If the CVP persists in that attitude, it could block the government bill in October.

Michel: I find it strange that as a party you participate in deciding a number of measures, but that you start questioning those again less than a month later. Quite frankly, I am amazed by what Frank Swaelen has proposed today through the GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN. He has a strange, piecemeal moral attitude. For example, today tax amnesty supposedly is acceptable only for inherited black money.

[Question] If the CVP members of the chamber block the government bill in October, will that be a breaking point for you?

Michel: The only thing I'm asking is that then they supply other means for me to make money return to the country. This government urgently needs means to lighten its debt and to pursue a fresh start in obtaining employment opportunity. Besides the tax amnesty, it could thus borrow money, or revalue the gold of the Dutch Bank as Robert Henrion proposes, or reform Social Security. Billions could be picked up there. But no matter what, I will not sacrifice the goal for a dream of the CVP. The only thing I do not accept is ideological fetishism. Finally, we now have a government which is willing to take unpopular steps for the common good. You can't say that this is the government of one population group or another. It has a broad vision, on the medium-range term. Thanks to that broad vision one is no longer splitting hairs in governing. At times, perhaps.

[Question] When? The Voer region? Cockerill Sambre?

Michel: The Voer question was indeed splitting hairs, and at a certain moment, Cockerill-Sambre and Zeebrugge also. Hairsplitting occurs when the government wants to link one matter to another and an indigestible hash is cooked up. But that didn't prevent the government from establishing good measures overall, the result of which will be felt shortly. The competitiveness of business has returned, but public financing and employment still are formidable problems. This recovery policy thus has to be continued. It would be very serious indeed if the CVP right now really was looking for an electorally favorable breaking point.

[Question] Why is your party practically the only one which is still gaining in the polls?

Michel: The PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] is too, although to a lesser degree. Why? I think that the public senses our cohesion. We comprise an especially harmonious team in which everyone feels very happy because he is in a good post. Politics is not a game for us.

[Question] The image of your party does not appear to be suffering under the two-headed title Gol-Michel, does it?

Michel: The fact that everyone is in a post which suits him strengthens the cohesion instead. I am more a fieldman than Jean Gol; he is more cerebral. I just finished a tour of Wallonia and attracted 16,000 people at the Heizel. Next year I will have even more.

[Question] If you want even more than those 16,000, then why don't you open your arms to Mayor Nols? He could bring along a considerable number of people. Will he return to the liberal party of his first political steps. Do you want that?

Michels: Oh, what a clever question. But I will answer indirectly in order not to give away my strategy. The Nols-current is a popular current of an important part of the Brussels population and its themes are close to ours, although we would like to see them somewhat less radical, but that is a different problem. Everything which can strengthen the liberal social project is welcome, of course. For the Belgians need liberalism like bread. Socialization, the creeping collectivization, has caused too much evil. In this country it quenched enthusiasm for work, motivation, and the enterprising spirit. Whoever, with us, wants to react against that, is welcome, but not at any price. Not by any method.

[Question] Why is the CVP so nervous about Jean Gol as interim prime minister? Is Jean Gol going to commit indiscretions?

Michels: To start out, at the human level it should be pointed out that the prime minister might have expected more discretion from his own political friends at this moment. While he was powerless on his sickbed in Louvain, Frank Swaelen attacked. Of course Jean Gol is a slugger, but I can definitely assure the public that he will act in a scrupulously neutral and objective manner. Jean Gol has too profound a respect for forms and functions. Swaelen's warning that Gol will have to try to be /reserved/ was totally superfluous. Moreover, we did not ask for that post of interim prime minister; that is nothing but a problem for us.

[Question] Will there have to be more special powers?

Michels: What will have to be done as soon as possible is for the government to use the special powers it already has. Any kind of polemic and political speculation in the party can do nothing but obstruct the optimal use of the special powers.

[Question] But as parliamentarian you are not against that?

Michels: Without special powers nothing would have been possible. They really have been a shot in the arm. Whoever will succeed us will profit from them. If the socialists now consider them to be such bad measures, then I want to ask them whether, on the day they return to power, they will for example reinstate indexing, with a period of adaptation. Putting that into their program would be just as daring as the 100,000 jobs they promised at one time. Or will they reinstate the public service and retirement advantages, etc., which have been eliminated? Or will they initiate a capital tax --making the rich pay for the crisis, as their slogans painted on walls say? Their program is obvious, but what is dramatic for them, of course, is that these days one can see the socialist alternative operating in France.

[Question] Thinking back to your notorious Easter interview in LE SOIR, the question should be asked whether you would be able to govern with the socialists.

Michels: Unfortunately I cannot see that very well at this moment. The socialists would have to make a tremendous effort toward some degree of realism.

Their proposals and projects, and especially their alternative which I have seen in power for many years, do not allow me to believe in the possibility of such a coalition at this moment. I see no points of contact in their program.

[Question] How did you arrive at liberalism? To a Fleming it seems almost impossible for a Walloon not to be socialist.

Michel: I have been liberal since the age of 16, through having to watch organic socialism in Wallonia. The socialist metabolism is a rather inhuman machine. /Red or dead/. I lost my father at a very young age. We were a simple labor family which had to make do with very little. Financially I had a very difficult time studying, but I never managed to get a scholarship. Seated next to me in class, however, there were some sons of well-to-do socialists who did not have the same results in school that I had, but who did have scholarships. That predominance of the socialist machine shocked me. You see, a parish in Wallonia in socialist hands is something awful.

[Question] Does that closely resemble that so-called CVP state in Flanders?

Michel: Perhaps that's why usually they have got on so well. Power.

8700

CS0: 3614/136

REASONS FOR SUDDEN TURKMEN VISIT TO NICOSIA

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 23 Aug 83 p 17

[Article by M. Ali Kislali: "Ankara and Athens, Don't Become Involved in Cyprus "]

[Text] The reasons and background for Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen's sudden trip to Cyprus last weekend have become clear. After Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou met with Papandreou in Greece to discuss United Nations Secretary General de Cuellar's factfinding proposals, Denktas met with Turkmen.

Ilter Turkmen, responding to our questions about his sudden trip to Cyprus, told us, "We had not met with Denktas for quite some time. We felt like talking. He made the invitation and that was that. Cyprus is a beautiful place, I recommend that you visit there."

The foreign minister pointed out that it was up to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to respond to de Cuellar's dual list of factfinding questions and he stated, "As you know, we want this to be a matter between the two Cypriot communities and for Ankara and Athens not to become involved."

Circles close to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus revealed that Denktas and other officials have studied de Cuellar's questions but that they will not respond to them for at least two weeks. These sources continued, "The questions are secret. De Cuellar wants answers by mid-September. There are questions about the island continuing as a bi-zonal federation, about the constitution, the laws and about the division of territory. The questions have been formulated in such a way to determine the leanings of the two parties."

It was pointed out that the land ratios mentioned in de Cuellar's letter that would be allotted to the two sides would not be acceptable to the Turkish community. However, because of the "secrecy" these ratios were not made public.

It is being said that de Cuellar's proposals were assessed differently by the Greek Cypriots and by Greece, and that "There are differences between them as far as what had been agreed upon."

According to Foreign Ministry sources, should there be similarities between the responses received from the two communities to the de Cuellar letter, the secretary general will make a more specific proposal to begin new talks at the end of September.

A high level official in the Foreign Ministry said, "As you know, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has always been ready to talk; it has always been constructive. But if de Cuellar's letter does not find the proximity of views anticipated, there will be no use in beginning the negotiations."

Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen gave the following answer to HURRIYET's question, "Did you discuss a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence during your visit?": "You know our position on this matter. We say that the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has the right to self-determination. That says it all."

12280
CSO 3554/418

ANALYSIS OF PARTY GAINS, LOSSES IN MARCH ELECTIONS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Sep 83 p 4

[Text] Frankfurt, 31 August--The supposition is that in the 6 March Bundestag elections, the Greens--who were admitted to the Bundestag with 5.6 percent of the vote--found their voters mainly among young people. That is now verified by the evaluation of the test precincts that has now been presented by the Federal Statistical Office. These precincts are selected precincts that when seen together are as near as possible to being a miniature image of the overall electorate. In these precincts, the ballots are marked according to various age groups and according to sex. For this purpose, only sufficiently large precincts are taken (thus, for example, the legendary Hallig Groede with its 15 potential voters was not included) so that there can be no violation of election secrecy; the Federal Constitutional Court has expressly approved the procedure.

It provides more accurate results than opinion polls; to be sure, results are restricted to external characteristics such as age and sex. The numbers taken as a basis are greater: about 1.5 million of the 44.1 million potential voters voted in such test precincts in 1983, and it is actual voter behavior that counts, not a statement made later, in which, in turn, the polls have shown that poor memory or wishful thinking about how one would really like to have voted affects the facts. In a complicated procedure, the error rate in evaluating the test precincts is reduced. Finally, there is a check based on the overall election results. There is a small deviation from these results because those voting by absentee ballot cannot, for reasons of election secrecy, be included among the "test voters."

Among voters between 18 and 24 years of age, 13.9 percent voted for the Greens on 6 March, when the overall result for the new party was 5.6 percent. In the 1980 Bundestag elections, in which the Greens participated for the first time but failed with 1.5 percent, the relationship was even somewhat more favorable for the Greens: in that age group and with 4.8 percent (always taking the completely determinant second votes), they were three times stronger than the overall result in 1980, whereas now they are "only" about two and a half times stronger. In the 1983 elections, the Greens showed themselves to be a slightly masculine party: among young men between 18 and 24 years of age, 14.2 percent voted for the Greens compared to only 13.5 percent among women in the same age group. The proportion of votes going to the

Greens, again considering both sexes together, falls continuously with age. For those 25 to 34 years of age, it was still 10.8 percent. In the next decade (35 to 44 years of age), it was only 4.4 percent. For those 45 to 60 years of age, it was still 2.4 percent (a remarkable number compared with the 0.6 percent in 1980), and for those over 60 years of age, it was 1.2 percent.

Even though the Greens, as the new party in the Bundestag, can claim the most interest in a detailed review of the election results, the "established parties" are not to be ignored. In 1983, the CDU had results among the young voters between 18 and 24 years of age that, compared with the previous elections, reflect the Union's chancellor-candidate decisions in an impressive way. In 1976 and 1983, when Kohl was candidate for chancellor (or chancellor and candidate), the CDU, with 30.1 and 31.4 percent, was in relatively good standing with this voter group. In 1972, in the year of Barzel's candidacy, it did poorly, getting 26.5 percent, and in "Strauss-year" 1980, it did even worse: 25 percent. Even the CSU, with 10.3 percent in each of the Kohl-elections, came out somewhat better than it did in the Strauss election (9.9 percent).

In this youthful voter group, the SPD lost considerable ground, certainly for the benefit of the Greens. In 1972--Brandt's "peace elections" under the banner of "detente"--the SPD had a strong absolute majority here with 54.6 percent. That then fell slightly to 48.9 percent in the second Schmidt election in 1980. Then, in 1983 with Vogel as candidate, the decline was in the form of a free fall to 39.0 percent. In the case of the older voters, the SPD losses are continuous, as are the gains of the CDU; here it is particularly obvious how in the age group of the young adults, that is, those between 25 and 34 years of age, CDU strength remains stable at between 32 and 33 percent--this is true for the Barzel election in 1972, the Kohl election in 1976 and the Kohl election in 1983--whereas in this age group there was a steep fall in the 1980 Strauss election to 26.6 percent. That corresponds to the narrow impressions of that time: a generation that equated its accustomed way of life with liberality was of the opinion that "one certainly cannot vote for Strauss," not realizing that Strauss was by no means as dangerous for the indicated way of life as was commonly thought at the time. Striking is the stability of the CSU over the period of the four Bundestag elections from 1972 on in all age groups. Sometimes there is a 9, sometimes there is a 10 before the decimal point; that is all the range there is. That is in line with the view that the CSU has established itself in the consciousness of Bavarian voters as a particular kind of people's party--social, liberal, conservative and specific to Bavaria.

The FDP has suffered heavy losses among the young voters (18 to 24 years of age); it fell from 11.4 percent in the 1980 "anti-Strauss election," seen as such in particular by those leaning to the FDP, to 5.3 percent. Voters between 35 and 44 probably "saved" the FDP: it was here that the party, after a peak of 13.1 percent in 1980, still managed 8.6 percent. It may be that this above all is where the voters were who have been involved in vote splitting: according to the motto that the old coalition, as agreeable as it may have been in particular instances, is no longer workable, unless, of course,

no many concessions would be made in the direction of "socialism." Thus one should stick with what Genscher and Lambsdorff have decided on: at least an economic "turnabout" together with the otherwise little-appreciated thing, despite Strauss, who is appreciated even less. In the case of the FDP, it may be of interest that young women (between 18 and 24) have treated it even worse than young men in the same age group; the difference of 0.2 percent, however, could be approaching the statistical margin of error.

If one considers with the Federal Statistical Office the proportion of the overall electorate of the individual parties according to age groups, then the juvenile character of the Greens is seen even more clearly. Of its voters, 37 percent were between 18 and 24 years of age. However, the juvenile percentage was even more clear in 1980: 43.3 percent. For those 25 to 34 years of age as well, the proportion of the Greens in the 1983 elections is still high with 34.3 percent. The number, however, indicates a shrinkage when one considers that of the 43.3 percent very young Green voters of the 1980 election year, 3 years have gone over into the next-highest age group. Among those 35 and older, the proportion of Green voters in the party's "total yield" drops abruptly to 14.6 percent and then continues to decline. In regard to the proportion of young voters, determined in relation to the total number of voters in each party, the SPD is in the best position with 12.7 percent, but the difference among the "established" parties in the percentage of voters 18 to 24 years of age is not great. The CSU can count 11.8 percent of its voters in this group, the CDU 10.5 and the FDP 10.0 percent.

9/46

CSO: 3620/460

OPPOSING VIEWS OF EUROMISSILES INITIATIVE

Initiative Seen as Vital Duty

Athens EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 27-28 Aug 83 p 32

/Excerpts/ They are at least naive those who believed that the Greek government was under the illusion that there would be no reaction from the European governments when it took the initiative to postpone the deployment of the American missiles Cruise and Pershing for 6 months after 31 December. The New Democracy Party is especially naive--or pretends to be--when it believed it found one more opportunity to "put to rout" the government's foreign policy by characterizing it in this case as unrealistic.

The PASOK government, however, could not do otherwise since the alternative solution would be either to align itself with the American-NATOist policy of establishing missile equity by increasing their number instead of decreasing it, or to ignore the issue in an ostrich-like manner.

None of the two solutions could be followed by a government which is not swayed by a policy which plays with the fate and the very existence of humanity; because it is mathematically certain that the deployment of the American missiles will have a corresponding response from the opposite camp. The result will be a new disturbance of the terror balance and a new, endless effort to restore the balance on a higher level /more missiles on each side/ with the possibility of using them in the end. In such a case, we will not have the chance to preoccupy ourselves with the issue simply because we shall not exist.

If, indeed, those who received the government's initiative threw it in the wastebasket as the press of the Right wrote at a moment of superb nationalism and for the American flag--they would very much like to see Greece its 51st star--the people of Europe and their peace-loving political leaderships embraced it and made it the banner of the struggle for peace and detente. This lofty aim of the /government/ proposal was absolutely successful. What other proof is there than the "annoyance" of Washington which sees the peace movement "polluting" its very country also? Washington knows. It knows that people are not a neglectable kind. It knows that no government can ignore them without paying a penalty. It is for this reason that it takes them into account. It is for this reason that it was annoyed to a point it could not

publicly check its displeasure as did some other governments--its subrogates--which could simply reject the proposal without any characterizations.

This is why the Greek proposal fell on fertile soil. The wars are not won nor are they lost in a single battle, but are decided on the justice of the issue and on the will of the people to win. The people will win this war for peace because it is a war for their very existence.

The PASOK government will enjoy the big title that it raised the peaceful stature of a small country in a world divided by leaderships which blindly march toward the fateful hour of conflict and biblical catastrophe.

Papandreou Dissatisfied With U. S.

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek No 786, 25 Aug 83 p 6

[Excerpt] "With his recent (third-world) initiative to postpone the deployment of the American missiles in Europe, Premier Papandreou has gained a few days of 'tolerance' from KKE but received a hail of quaffs and scornful expressions from the Westerners."

This was the way a known leader of the opposition described Papandreou's recent initiative with the difference that his proposal was not met with quaffs but with stern remarks by the leaders of the West among whom--according to reports--was Reagan also.

Troubles

While the Westerners place the Papandreou proposal in the framework of his third world and pro-Soviet explosions, Averof, the leader of the opposition, searched for the motives of the initiative in Papandreou's domestic problems. "I sincerely fear," he said, "that the government's intention is to divert the attention of the Greek public opinion from four domestic difficulties..."

The attitude of the political--and especially of the parapolitical--columns of the opposition newspapers was the same.

Revenge...

Political observers of the conservative front pinpointed Papandreou's initiative in two other sectors.

First: Papandreou acted because he was extremely annoyed by the American coolness toward him. They explained: Papandreou has repeatedly expressed his desire to be received by the American president. All his efforts, however, found the American leadership "unconcerned"--according to a pro-government newspaper. The Americans are disposed to invite Karamanlis but not Papandreou. Even Papandreou's visit to New York shortly--through an invitation from New Delhi--has not moved the Americans who--according to sources which are reliable

and friendly to Papandreou--have not expressed a desire to meet with him.

After the /Agreement for/ the Bases

Second: Papandreou triggered this new pro-Soviet explosion in order to cover his other serious "openings". It is not so much the tumbling of the drachma not only in relation to the dollar nor even to the French franc; nor is it the high rise in prices and the extinction of the foreign exchange reserves. It is "some ambiguous points" of the agreement for the bases whose publication cannot be postponed any further. With his pro-Soviet initiative, Papandreou is securing the precious (for him) KKE silence both on the economic problems and in the disputed points of the Greek-American agreement for the bases.

Already RIZOSPASTIS gladly received the Papandreou proposal for the missiles and ignored the "protests of the workers" about the high prices as well as the "idle discussion on the maintenance" of the bases.

7520

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KKE FORBEARANCE OF PASOK SEEN LASTING TO EURO-ELECTIONS

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 31 Aug 83 p 6

/Analysis by Th. P. Kassimis: "The Engagement Breaks Up"7

/Text7 The government seems to preserve the tolerance of the dogmatic KKE in order to pass a relatively tranquil autumn and prepare for the Europarlament election next May. The "engagement" between the government and the orthodox Communist Party, which was renewed and sealed during Papandreou's visit to Moscow on the occasion of the Brezhnev funeral, is expected to last at least until the end of the year.

Despite the fact that on three basic questions PASOK and KKE should be theoretically in opposition, in reality KKE tolerates, if it does not fully support, the government in two policy areas. The break of the engagement or at least the "character incompatibility" is expected at the beginning of the coming year and is connected with the last stages of the Euro-election campaign. The government today has the tolerance of the pro-Soviet KKE on the question of the bases and on its economic policies, and this at times reaches the point of open support.

The Agreement For the Bases

In any event, we cannot consider the bases issue as closed. The initialing of the agreement is only a first step toward its solution. If the agreement had been initialed by a government known for its consistency and self respect, its ratification by the Chamber of Deputies would be a mere formality. This, of course, does not mean it is probable that the government will use its parliamentary majority to reject the agreement itself initialed and presented as its own success. But it is certain that it will use the debate for ratification by the Chamber of Deputies "for public consumption" and, no doubt, to have some "bold words" against our Western allies and especially the United States.

The efforts of Papandreou to arrange a meeting with President Reagan and the indifference shown by the other side of the Atlantic must have annoyed him very much. In fact, it is said that one of the reasons he decided to participate in the "fiesta" organized by Mrs. Gandhi in New York was his desire to meet with the American president. Of course, Reagan already annoyed by Indira Gandhi's conference, not only did not respond positively to the

hints, but the White House let it be understood that Papandreu is not visiting New York as EEC chairman but as the chairman of PASOK since he does not represent his country as premier, but will participate in a gathering of Third World politicians. Papandreu will now have one more reason to voice his anti-Americanism in the debate for the bases.

The dogmatic KKE, despite the fact that theoretically it appears to oppose the agreement on the bases, in reality faithfully following Moscow's directives, it supports with its tolerance the government's initiative. Characteristically, KKE's basic slogan is "the bases should leave during this term of the Chamber of Deputies." This means that it basically accepts as a fact the government's trick that "this is an agreement for the removal, not the preservation of the bases."

Following Papandreu's visit to the Kremlin it is believed that the informal agreement with KKE was not only sealed but it became even more effective. So, we see for several months now PASOK's weekly publication to have put on the shelf its ideological confrontation with the dogmatic KKE.

We have also seen Kostopoulos, the Secretary General of Press and Information and the main advocate of this line, to have discontinued his articles.

Tolerance in the Economic Sector

Another sector in which one could have expected a controversy between the government and KKE is that of economic policy, including that of syndicalist activity. But in reality here, too, we find a great amount of tolerance if not support for the governmental policy.

According to political observers this policy of the orthodox KKE is due to the following reasons:

- a. The institutional measures taken by the government are designed to weaken private initiative and expand statism in the country's economic life. In reality these measures are in line with the political position and objectives of KKE which believes that "the farther from capitalism the closer to communism."
- b. The government's income policy gave the opportunity to KKE to denounce the "one-sided austerity," but the overall reaction was lukewarm. Naturally KKE keeps the right to exploit at any moment the displeasure of the workers, believing that a dissatisfied and economically disappointed worker is an easier prey to its propaganda.
- c. In the syndicalist area, PASOK is continuously losing ground and for this reason KKE has no reason to worry. By contrast, just a year ago it worried even over a possible strengthening of KKE-Int., but developments showed that the Eurocommunist Party was unable to exploit the decline of the government. The intellectualist policy which is associated with the KKE-Int. has been

unable to attract dissatisfied voters of the Left.

Thus, although many expected a rift in the relations between the government and the dogmatic KKE, such a rift does not appear very probable for the time being.

The Euro-elections

The only issue on which KKE cannot remain indifferent and feels obliged to enter the battle with all its forces is the Euro-parliament election next May. If in 1981 the Euro-elections were of little interest, today the situation is exactly the opposite. Then the polarization of the parliamentary election had virtually eliminated from the political stage the small parties which shifted their weight on the Euro-elections to claim that their popular base was much greater than their non-existent representation in the national parliament. Indeed, both the Party of Democratic Socialism /KODISO/ and KKE-Int. were proven right. Today, however, the results of the Euro-election have special significance both for the major and small parties and coalitions because:

- a. The New Democracy Party will use the results of the Euro-election to prove that the government no longer represents a majority and at the same time to present a spectacular return of voters to its fold.
- b. PASOK will try to preserve as large a percentage as possible knowing that the psychology of the defeated will affect negatively the electorate in the parliamentary election even if the election takes place at the end of the 4-year term.
- c. KKE will try to increase its strength as much as possible to make clear to PASOK that it should remember in the parliamentary election that "Change without KKE is not possible."
- d. Finally, both KKE-Int. and KODISO will try to gain points and substance which they will use in the next elections. It is certain that the government, being aware of all this, will usher in the new year with a purely pre-election policy. The statement by National Economy Minister Ger. Arsenis that "all indications convince us that the income policy in 1984 will be more relaxed" was not accidental. If one considers this from a purely economic point of view, one will develop doubts about the financial abilities of Arsenis. But for lack of negative reactions, his statement must be considered as a clear sign that the government will exercise a pre-election policy of a few months with a target of having the least possible losses in the elections for the Euro-council.

KKE also cannot accept only a limited increase of its strength. It will aim much more at achieving a percentage increase much greater than that of KKE-Int. Otherwise it will face real problems in its efforts to become, during the general parliamentary elections, a pole of character for the displeased leftists. Thus, at the end of the year we should also expect the end of the PASOK-KKE "engagement." How large and how real the split will depend on many factors. However, the results of the Euro-elections next May will constitute the decisive reason for the continuation of their relations.

LALOTIS REPORTEDLY DISLIKED BY PAPANDREOU ENTOURAGE

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 30 Aug 83 p 1

[Excerpts] While A. Papandreou decided to address several party affairs--starting with the Panhellenic conference of PASOK cadres next Friday and Saturday--to counter the increasing development of anti-leadership moves by N. Kargopoulos and other "heretics" of the Movement, increasing reports claim that K. Laliotis (and possibly Kim. Koulouris and other PASOK cadres) may leave their governmental posts and devote their time to party activities.

This matter, which was first revealed 10 days ago by MESIMVRINI, was essentially confirmed by the government spokesman yesterday with a strange statement that the return of Laliotis and of other cadres to strictly party duties depends "on the decision of the Movement's collective organs" and not on their wishes.

According to reliable sources, the PASOK chairman and his closest associates are worried about the appeal of the Kargopoulos anti-leadership movement--even after the expulsion of the six cadres--among cadres of the more leftist wing of PASOK, and about the secret polls which show that the PASOK following has declined to 31-33 percent.

In view of the June 1984 Eurodeputy election, A. Papandreou feels there is immediate need for a counter attack but also a reorganization of the party machinery which has declined since the election. The Papandreou speech to the Panhellenic conference of PASOK cadres and on the 9th anniversary of PASOK's founding (Papandreou will refer to the political goals and the role of PASOK in this period, while the Executive Bureau will analyze the decision of the 10th Conference of the Central Committee) and on 19 October at a mass gathering at Syntagma Square on PASOK's 2 years in power, are part of this counter attack. The Laliotis question is seen in the context of the reorganization and strengthening of the party mechanism.

The departure of Laliotis from the government is examined by PASOK and was admitted yesterday--indirectly but clearly--by government spokesman Kostopoulos. Laliotis is disliked by the inner group of Papandreou, considering that his youth and his promotion as a leading personality of PASOK's left wing come into conflict with the ambitions of the premier's son George Papandreou who remains a candidate for deputy minister of popular

advancement. The inner group would like to remove Laliotis from the post of deputy minister of youth because he is also regarded as responsible for the takeover by KKE of the cultural and other affairs PASOK organized.

Laliotis agreed to leave the government provided his exit would be honorable and that he would have the opportunity to play the role of party reformer for its return to the right ideological course and at the same time he would help the strengthening of the organization.

This, however, causes concern to Papandreou and his inner group (and causes strong reactions on the part of the leading aspirant successor-- Akis Tsokhatzopoulos) because in effect it would strengthen Laliotis who would become more dangerous by spreading his influence among the party cadres.

In any event, according to reliable governmental sources, one should not rule out that--in the future--it will be decided to move away from the government, not only Laliotis but other cadres as well, in view of the planned PASOK Congress in early 1984 and the Euro-elections.

It is recalled that according to earlier MESIMVRINI reports there was some thought in PASOK (shared by Papandreou) to call the members of the Executive Bureau to choose either their cabinet position or their post in the Executive Bureau. It is possible that this may eventually happen under the pretext that they have to work in the preparation of the Congress. This will allow Papandreou to renew the group of his associates in the party while giving, at the same time, a new face to his government.

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REPORTED INTRAPARTY FEUDS REND ND FABRIC

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 31 Aug 83 pp 1-2

/Text/ The New Democracy Party is in a coma after repeated political gaffs, the absence of real opposition, the lack of an "anti-platform" to the governmental program and the events last weekend in the Vitsi mountains. The fear that the extreme Right will form its own party led the ND directorate to take part in the festivals of hate.

The government on its part has even ceased to reply to the speeches of the ND chairman. Averof, facing the charges leveled by ND cadres for mistakes, is engaged in tactical maneuvers he believes can assure his stay in the party leadership.

While the ND is organizationally at its nadir as we were told yesterday by a leading ND personality and former minister, Averof set the stage for the mutual elimination of the aspirants to the party chairmanship.

One of the Averof maneuvers is that while the ND had four parliamentary spokesmen--K. Papaconstandinou, K. Steganopoulos, K. Mitsotakis and G. Palaiokrasas--during the summer he assigned one more: G. Varvitsiotis. The next move he is now planning, according to his associates, is to assign as of October a parliamentary spokesman for each major sector.

The Aspirants

He thus believes that the ambitious aspirants and deputy-aspirants will come under his influence while they will fight each other to climb to the top.

Beyond that and always within the context of bringing the machinery of the party under control, Averof appointed one of his friends to take charge of a new office on Pindarou Street to organize the campaign for the election of the Eurodeputies in June 1984. He is Professor Koryzis (who lost his post to Metaxas), a cousin of Papalincouras, who is not regarded as the right person, according to ND sources.

On the question of the fiasco last Sunday at Vitsi Averof faces not only intraparty complaints but also the displeasure of the highest non-parliamentary factors.

Averof's reply is that the instructions for the participation of ND deputies were given in order not to be overtaken by the extreme Right and that at Jitsi it was proven that "we are not walking together with the Union of Free Socialists /ENEK/."

Cadres of the "enlightened" ND wing counter that similar instructions were not given for the presence of deputies in the festivities of the Armed Services Day on 15 August in Salonica.

Furthermore, while the government moves forward to the implementation of its program with the introduction of institutional bills for the solution of the problems of the "failing enterprises," of foreign affairs and of the assumption of significant initiatives, Averof is accused by cadres of his party that "he spends his time travelling from village to village giving speeches to mastic producing villages as in Khios." In this way, "...anyone can do what he pleases in the party, without shame..."

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CSO: 3521/437

PEM JUDICIARY COMMITTEE CHANGES IN PRESS BILL

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 8 Sep 83 pp 1,11

[Text] ANKARA--The bill providing for revision of the Press Act (No. 5620) was approved in the Judiciary Committee of the Consultative Assembly with a few modifications.

In accordance with these modifications, the owner of a publication is entitled to request compensation for damages, in the event that a decision rendered by the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic to confiscate that publication is nullified by a court judgment. Also, articles and photographs not submitted for publication will not constitute a 'crime.' The Committee reduced the period of time the court has to close down a publication containing an article constituting a 'crime' from three months to one month. It also added a clause stipulating that the measures called for in the bill in the event of a 'crime' cannot stop the operation of printing presses and other press equipment.

The Press Act draft is expected to be a priority topic of discussion in the General Council of the Consultative Assembly at the beginning of this coming week. The provisions introduced in the draft are as follows:

- No individual who has been convicted of a crime falling under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, or of aiding or abetting such crimes, shall hold the office of Director of a publication.
- In the event of publication without a permit, such publication can be stopped by the Court of First Instance at the request of the office of the Public Prosecutor.
- Responsibility for crimes committed in publications shall fall upon the author of the article, report, photograph or caricature in question, as well as upon the Director of the publication. The Director's punishment shall be in the form of a fine.
- Responsibility for anonymous articles, reports, photographs or

caricatures shall fall upon the author, as well as upon the director of a publication. The publisher shall also be liable.

--Responses or corrections sent in within three months of publication in instances where the honor and dignity of individuals is affected shall be published without fail. The Magistrate of the Criminal Court for Petty Offenses shall examine the response or correction within five days at the latest. The Director of the publication shall then have five days to object. Should he reject the Magistrate's request for correction, he shall have the right to appeal to the Court of First Instance as well as the High Criminal Courts. (Formerly, the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance was final.)

--Publishing information or documents relating to allegations prior to the time that formal charges are filed shall be punishable by imprisonment from one to six months and a fine of 100,000-200,000 Turkish lira.

--Any individual introducing, publishing, translating or reprinting a publication banned by the Assembly of Ministers shall be imprisoned for a period ranging from three months to one year. (The original draft calls for six months to two years.)

--Presenting suicide accounts in a way that will affect the reader shall incur a fine of 20,000-50,000 Turkish lira. Photographic coverage of rape incidents or marriages of minors shall be punishable by a fine of 50,000-100,000 Turkish lira. (The Committee deleted from the text the stipulation that employers of correspondents who fail to conform to certain specifications in the Press Act shall be imprisoned for up to one month.)

--A stiff fine shall be imposed in the event that a published article, report, or photograph is re-published elsewhere without permission.

--Should a refutation be delayed, a fine of 40,000-100,000 Turkish lira shall be imposed every day of the delay. Failure to publish a refutation shall be punishable by imprisonment from two weeks to three months.

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MUMCU EXAMINES PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 8 Sep 83 pp 1,11

[Article by Ugur Mumcu: "Judicial Problems..."]

[Text] In a speech he made on the occasion of the new judiciary year, Derviş Turhan, Chief Judge of the High Court of Appeal, stated: "Having a judiciary that is tied to the legislative or executive branch of government, or to a combination of the two, is the biggest danger to society."

The principle of judicial independence touched on by Judge Turhan is most crucial to the power and functioning of the judiciary. It is a guarantee needed not so much for the sake of judges themselves as for the sake of society. Reduce this guarantee, and you tip the scales of justice. Once that happens, society is bound to suffer sooner or later.

For a long time, we have been defending the principles of judicial independence and university independence. These are both guarantees that make our democracy what it is. Just as judicial independence must be maintained vis-a-vis the legislative and executive organs of our government, so too, university independence must be maintained vis-a-vis privileged firms and circles in our society. Maintaining these principles is far more important than just having legal guarantees of their existence.

Can university faculty members working as consultants for 'big business' firms really act as independently as they should? For example, can a professor who is a legal consultant for a firm really be impartial when it comes to employer-employee relations? Can a professor of Pharmacology who is on the payroll of a drug firm really publicize his views on harmful drugs? Can an Economics professor working as a bank consultant or a member of the bank's Board of Directors say what his knowledge of economics tells him regarding money/credit arrangements?

What a pity that for years university independence has been used

more as a shield for the 'corporate professor' to hide behind than as a tool for pursuing knowledge and freedom! Yes, what a pity that this is how things are, and that our most privileged university professors today are these 'corporate professors!'

And now let's turn to the judiciary...

The facts disclosed by Judge Turhan force us to look at the economic side of judicial independence. According to Turhan, there are 6881 judges and prosecutors in Turkey. Of these, 510 work in the martial law courts; 5071 work on the 2,640,093 dossiers on file; 1300 are non-practicing. Resignations among judges and prosecutors have increased in recent years because of economic conditions.

These figures and the supporting facts make it easy to see why the work of justice is a ponderous task in Turkey.

Most of our prosecutors and judges work in inadequate surroundings. They do not even have private chambers where they can examine dossiers. This is even a problem at the Ministry of Justice in Ankara. Court is being held in rented work spaces. This deplorable situation has been going on for years. The old Ministry of Justice building, known as the Palace of Justice, is reserved strictly for criminal courts. A number of prosecutors all work together in one room of this so-called 'Palace,' and the Judges use these work rooms to hold trials.

Certain social measures need to be taken in a country where a month's rent exceeds a judge's monthly salary. One of the most important of these measures is solving the housing problem. As Judge Turhan mentioned, "Many prosecutors and judges have to live in housing unsuited to the sacred service they perform." This problem must be resolved as soon as possible.

A judge is someone who decides the outcome of billions of legal disputes. If he does not have a home where he can hang his hat or a comfortable working environment, you tell me what judicial independence vis-a-vis the legislative and executive branches of government is going to mean to him???

Rendering justice is the most sensitive, the most respectable, and the most important task to a society. Those who perform this task should have a standard of living suited to their needs as well as to the sacred function they perform. This is why it is absolutely essential that their salaries be adjusted to conform to today's living conditions, and that their problems with housing and working conditions be resolved as soon as possible.

We say 'Our country is built on justice,' but we often forget

that those who work to secure that foundation are human beings who live and have to live under these deplorable conditions of society.

I salute our judges and prosecutors, who do their work by making 1001 sacrifices, yet stand tall against these grave conditions with the honor and dignity that befits the sacred duty they perform!

12279

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REFUGEES FROM TEHRAN REGIME, WAR ENTER TURKEY

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 18 Aug 83 pp 1, 13

/Article by Faik Kaptan, Faruk Keskin and Mehmet Ozakay/

/Text/ The families that fled Iran in "mass escapes" have added a new customs point to the 36 existing ones. The Iranians named this place "The Door of Salvation," an obvious reference to the fear of death, bullets, strafing, hot sun, rain, mountains and valleys crossed after a thousand and one problems that have to be negotiated before reaching it. The families who stake everything in order to pass through this door say: "Aside from the threats to our lives, we have to pay substantial sums (measured in millions of Turkish lira) to the mercenaries of Khomeyni in order to cross the frontier." Correspondents of HURRIYET and HURRIYET NEWS AGENCY report the drama of four families who fled Iran.

Our Son Died

A couple who were captured wounded after an armed skirmish at the border during their escape from Iran abetted by the Pastars, Khomeyni's mercenaries, said that "the Pastars took 1.5 million lira from us to arrange our escape to Turkey."

Muhammad Selimi and his wife Hasmet Haydaryar, who is a nurse, were captured by Turkish authorities during their escape abetted by the Pastars, Khomeyni's mercenaries (a majority of these are Kurds disaffected by the secessionist forces in northern Iran). Selimi narrated their escape as follows:

"We were living in Tehran. My wife was frequently taken to the war zone, since she is a nurse. I was under continual harassment. I could not take such a life any longer. I heard from a friend about Pastars taking people to Turkey. I talked to these people through my friend. They asked for 1.5 million lira to arrange our escape--myself, my wife and our son. I agreed. We left Teheran at 3:00 am. We arrived at a village near the Turkish border and waited there for the darkness of the night. We were seen by the sentries patrolling the area as we and our two uniformed companions approached to 500 meters of the border. Our companions started shooting at the soldiers, who had given us the warning to 'stop.' Shooting started on both sides. Our son died and we were wounded. Before this, many of my relatives had fled to Turkey by paying up and had sought asylum in other countries."

My Daughter Disappeared

Zoya Lotfi, the wife of Kerim Gorgun (who is one of the leaders of the Iranian Kurds and has been put in jail after being captured during his war against Khomeyni) and her three children were deported from Sweden where they had sought asylum and were sent to Turkey under police custody.

Zoya Lotfi, who was brought to Istanbul yesterday evening on a Scandinavian Air Lines plane accompanied by three Swedish police, one of them a policewoman, pleaded with the Turkish police into whose custody she was transferred: "Please tell these Swedish police I have lost my 11-year-old daughter Roya (in Sweden). Could they find her and send her to me?" The Turkish police officials communicated her wish to the Swedish police and obtained their promise to do something about it.

The Turkish police officials, in whose custody Zoya Lotfi was placed, decided to let her go free on grounds that she had made legal entry and exit into and from Turkey and therefore was eligible to stay in Turkey within the prescribed time limit.

Caught in Istanbul

Iranian families who fled Iran with false passports in order to get away from the war and the Khomeyni were captured by the police in Istanbul.

Houshan Kerami, assistant professor in physics in Iran, his wife Jale, his 6-year-old daughter Megor and Rahmat Farnoud, a jeweller, his wife Afefe and his 1-year-old son Safaki came secretly to the Iranian border last week in order to flee Iran. The two families, who say they could not stand the Khomeyni regime any longer, crossed into Turkey with the aid of Iranian smugglers, to whom they paid close to 2 million lira. The Kerami and Farnoud families, having parted company with the smugglers, succeeded in reaching Tatvan after a trek lasting 3 full days over mountains and hills, carrying their children as well. After staying in Tatvan for a while, they reached Istanbul, which they had been dreaming about for days, in a mood of joy now that they tasted freedom. However, when the Iranians who were staying at a hotel in Sehremini were searched by the police, their passports turned out to be false and they were arrested. Later, charges were laid against the two Iranian families at the Fatih court for carrying false passports. The same day, it was decided by the first procedural court that the Iranians would not be detained since the false passports were not produced in Turkey.



ESCAPE ROUTE. Iranian families reach Baskale, a town in Van Province, after paying millions of lira to mercenaries.

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